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THE MEANING OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY: AN EXAMINATION OF 
SUPREME COURT CONFIRMATION DEBATES AND SUPREME COURT 





Three years into the Trump presidency and especially in the 
aftermath of Justice Kavanaugh’s elevation to the Supreme Court, the 
ideal of judicial impartiality is once again central in our public discourse. 
Because we have, in turn, a president especially skeptical of the judiciary’s 
separation from partisanship, heightened political polarization, and 
heightened stakes around judicial rulings in this age of gridlocked 
governance, the question of how judges approach their work has assumed 
a significance that goes beyond concern over the outcomes they will reach.  
However, as important as the concept of judicial impartiality may be, 
it is worth pausing to examine what speakers generally mean when they 
mention the term. In this Article, I argue that at its core, the invocation of 
“judicial impartiality” in political discourse speaks to an ideal of fairness: 
an impartial judge is a person who acts fairly toward all parties in a case 
appearing before them. My focus in this article is on examining the 
concept of judicial impartiality in this familiar sense, with the hope of 
providing some insight into the underlying norms that structure our public 
discourse around judicial appointments, judicial rulings, and responses 
by elected officials to judicial rulings.  
This Article seeks to advance three claims. First, I claim that the 
divergent Democratic and Republican views on judicial impartiality—as 
illustrated in the context of the Supreme Court confirmation hearings and 
debates for Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Sonia Sotomayor—are 
rooted in each party’s distinct electoral coalitions and ideological 
histories. Secondly, I claim that notwithstanding these divergences, both 
Democratic and Republican-appointed justices on the Supreme Court 
share a common institutional environment at present of judicial 
uncertainty. This shared institutional condition, I argue, alters how 
Democratic and Republican-appointed justices are able to implement 
their respective visions of judicial impartiality in actual adjudication. On 
this point, I discuss some of the Roberts Court’s recent rulings on race and 
equal protection to help anchor the examination of judicial impartiality in 
constitutional doctrine. Finally, in the final portion of the Article, my 
argument takes a normative turn in making my third claim: accepting that 
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some degree of partiality is inevitable in the judicial role, judicial 
impartiality is best understood as denoting a consistent, good-faith 
engagement with the claims and interests of those who lie outside the 
social groups that are aligned with a judicial actor. I conclude the Article 
with a few words on what this conception of judicial impartiality might 
imply, or even demand, of Democratic and Republican-appointed judicial 
actors seeking to uphold the ideal of judicial impartiality in the present 
time. 
 
In response to then-Judge Brett Kavanaugh’s testimony in front of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee on an allegation of sexual assault, more than 2400 law 
professors signed a public letter opposing his nomination to the Supreme Court. The 
letter stated in part: 
 
Even in his prepared remarks, Judge Kavanaugh described the hearing as 
partisan, referring to it as “a calculated and orchestrated political hit,” 
rather than acknowledging the need for the Senate, faced with new 
information, to try to understand what had transpired. Instead of trying to 
sort out with reason and care the allegations that were raised, Judge 
Kavanaugh responded in an intemperate, inflammatory and partial 
manner, as he interrupted and, at times, was discourteous to senators. 
 
. . .  
We have differing views about the other qualifications of Judge 
Kavanaugh. But we are united, as professors of law and scholars of judicial 
institutions, in believing that he did not display the impartiality and 
judicial temperament requisite to sit on the highest court of our land.1 
 
The following month, in response to a ruling by Judge Jon Tigar of the U.S. District 
Court on asylum claims, President Trump remarked that the ruling was “not law,” 
“a disgrace,” that in “[e]very case that gets filed in the Ninth Circuit we get beaten,” 
and that Judge Tigar “was an Obama judge.”2 These comments set off a noteworthy 
exchange with Chief Justice John Roberts, who in turn stated: “We do not have 
Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton judges.”3 Rather, Roberts 
maintained that “[w]hat we have is an extraordinary group of dedicated judges doing 
their level best to do equal right to those appearing before them. That independent 
                                               
1 Opinion, The Senate Should Not Confirm Kavanaugh, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://nyti.ms/2OBGfjC [https://perma.cc/YK2K-NWJ8]. I should note that I was a signer 
of this letter. 
2 Adam Liptak, Trump Takes Aim at Appeals Court, Calling It a Disgrace, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 21 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/20/us/politics/trump-appeals-court-
ninth-circuit.html [https://perma.cc/F9RE-23GW]. 
3 Id.  
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judiciary is something we should all be thankful for.”4 In response, Trump 
commented in a tweet: “Sorry Chief Justice John Roberts, but you do indeed have 
‘Obama judges,’ and they have a much different point of view than the people who 
are charged with the safety of our country.”5 
We are thus at a moment where judicial impartiality is once again central in 
public discussion. Because we have, in turn, a president especially skeptical of the 
judiciary’s separation from partisanship,6 heightened political polarization, and 
heightened stakes around judicial rulings in this age of gridlocked governance, the 
question of how judges approach their work has assumed a significance that goes 
beyond concern over the outcomes they will reach.7  
However, as important as the concept of judicial impartiality may be, it is worth 
pausing to examine what speakers generally mean when they mention the term.8 
This seems a timely question, if only because there are a number of reasons to be 
concerned about the dynamics of federal judicial appointments for the remainder of 
the Trump presidency and beyond. Public and scholarly anxieties about federal 
judicial appointments—particularly Supreme Court appointments—are hardly new.9 
Extreme partisanship and the breakdown of senatorial norms surrounding Supreme 
                                               
4 Id. 
5 Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Nov. 21, 2018 12:51 PM), 
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1065346909362143232 [https://perma.cc/7Y6T 
-E2CP]. 
6 In a similar vein, then-candidate Trump had also raised a racially-charged claim that 
U.S. District Court Judge Gonzalo P. Curiel, who was overseeing a class-action lawsuit 
against Trump University, was biased against him because Judge Curiel was of Mexican 
heritage. See The Editorial Board, Donald Trump and the Judge, N.Y. TIMES (May 31, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/opinion/donald-trump-and-the-judge.html?module= 
inline [https://perma.cc/R8M5-BBE8]; Liptak, supra note 2. 
7 See infra Part III on contemporary political polarization. 
8 Charles Geyh very helpfully disaggregates the concept of judicial impartiality along 
three distinct dimensions—a procedural dimension, a political dimension, and an ethical 
dimension—though he also acknowledges the possibility or even the likelihood of overlap 
across them on certain issues. Charles Gardner Geyh, The Dimensions of Judicial 
Impartiality, 65 FLA. L. REV. 493, 493, 511–14 (2014). I believe my discussion of judicial 
impartiality implicates all three dimensions he identifies. Beyond that, my core concerns in 
this article are primarily within the area that Geyh labels the political dimension, and 
secondarily within the procedural dimension. Thus, as the following paragraphs will clarify, 
my examination of judicial impartiality is much less expansive than his, and focused on 
particular components of this ideal. 
9 See, e.g., Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 
935–42 (1995) (urging greater exploration of a judicial nominee’s substantive views in the 
Senate’s confirmation hearings and debates); Geoffrey R. Stone, Understanding Supreme 
Court Confirmations, 2010 SUP. CT. REV. 381, 442–54 (2010) (attributing the increasing 
divisiveness of the Supreme Court confirmation process after 2000 to a broader public 
perception about the politicization of the Court). 
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Court nominations has long been a point of public discussion.10 Still, there is good 
reason to think that the increasing polarization of partisan politics since the start of 
the Trump presidency—alongside the heightened frequency of “constitutional 
hardball”11 tactics during this time—will only amplify already-significant concerns 
around appointments to the federal judiciary, and the inability of judicial actors to 
remain impartial.12  
The focus of my attention in this Article is on the ideal of judicial impartiality, 
particularly as described in Supreme Court confirmation debates and as applied in 
the Court’s more recent cases dealing with race under the Equal Protection Clause.13 
As is the case with terms like “judicial activism” or “judicial independence,” 
“judicial impartiality” is a term that encompasses, and plausibly intersects with, a 
wide range of legal and ethical concerns. At its core, however, one might say without 
courting too much controversy that “judicial impartiality” speaks in some measure 
to a norm of fairness: an impartial judge is a person who acts in a fair or unbiased 
                                               
10 See, e.g., Grace Sparks, Americans Think the Supreme Court Nomination Process Is 
Way Too Partisan, CNN (June 27, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/27/politics/scotus-
partisanship-poll/index.html [https://perma.cc/WP29-SLVJ]; Livia Gershon, How Supreme 
Court Nominations Became Political Battles, JSTOR DAILY (Feb. 18, 2016), 
https://daily.jstor.org/how-supreme-court-nominations-became-political-battles/ [https:// 
perma.cc/7S8A-WERL]. 
11 As Mark Tushnet defines the term, constitutional hardball: 
 
consists of political claims and practices—legislative and executive initiatives—
that are without much question within the bounds of existing constitutional 
doctrine and practice but that are nonetheless in some tension with existing pre-
constitutional understandings. . . . [I]ts practitioners see themselves as playing for 
keeps in a special kind of way . . . 
 
Mark Tushnet, Constitutional Hardball, 37 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 523, 523 (2004). 
12 Dan Kahan stated the following in 2011:  
 
[T]here is something different now: a widespread sense of futility, and even 
cynicism. We take for granted that “shaping the Court” is part and parcel of the 
major parties’ political agendas — at issue not just in elections of presidents, but 
also in the everyday operation of the Senate, which routinely blocks appointment 
of lower court nominees whose potential elevation to the Court might decisively 
shift its ideological balance. Professions of “impartiality” ritualistically extracted 
from Supreme Court nominees in their confirmation hearings are contemptuously 
jeered as theater.  
 
Dan M. Kahan, Foreword: Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for 
Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1, 5 (2011). See also id. at 4–6. 
13 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States 
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which . . . [will] deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”). 
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manner toward all parties in a case appearing before them.14 As such, I proceed from 
the view in this Article that common invocations of the ideal of “judicial 
impartiality” really speak to an ideal of “judicial fairness,” or one’s confidence that 
a judge will treat the litigants and issues in front of her with fairness. My focus in 
this Article is on examining the concept of judicial impartiality in this familiar sense. 
Furthermore, my goal is to examine this issue by trying to gain some understanding 
of how Supreme Court nominees/justices and Senators have themselves addressed 
this issue in confirmation hearings, confirmation debates, and in a focused set of 
judicial opinions. In a general sense, I hope that by illuminating the contours of 
judicial impartiality in the present time, we might gain some understanding of the 
status of this concept within our broader legal and political culture. This, in turn, 
might give us some insight into the nature of judicial legitimacy within the 
contemporary context.  
Hence my goals here are in good measure descriptive and explanatory; I intend 
to explicate some dimensions of judicial impartiality as that ideal and concept is 
presently understood.15 However, there is a normative component to my argument 
as well. As I will discuss below, I do believe that within present debates, there are 
areas of potential convergence as to what judicial impartiality entails. Highlighting 
and elaborating on those points of convergence may, in turn, provide some useful 
guidelines for those political and judicial actors who feel compelled to uphold and 
further the ideal of judicial impartiality. 
In the pages below, I proceed with a more focused look at these issues by 
concentrating on two sets of items meant to provide a preliminary exploration of 
these themes in the contemporary context. First, in Part I, I proceed by initially 
fleshing out some preliminary concepts tied to judicial impartiality as they have been 
discussed in the legal literature. As this Part will clarify, my focus on judicial 
impartiality is limited to one specific, though still significant, component of that 
ideal: the degree to which judicial actors should feel bound to engage in general 
applications of the law versus more context-sensitive applications of the law. Stated 
otherwise, should an impartial judge take into account social facts about the litigants 
before her or not?  
With this conceptual background in place, I move on in Part II to examine the 
confirmation hearings and debates for Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Sonia 
Sotomayor. This Part provides much of the basis for the descriptive claims in this 
paper, as the entryway into understanding how the concept of judicial impartiality is 
commonly deployed in public discourse. My choice to focus on Chief Justice 
                                               
14 See The Senate Should Not Confirm Kavanaugh, supra note 1. 
15 In his insightful article, “Legitimacy and the Constitution,” Richard Fallon 
disaggregates constitutional legitimacy into three types of legitimacy: legal, sociological, and 
moral. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Legitimacy and the Constitution, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1787, 
1790 (2005). Fallon’s discussion of sociological legitimacy builds upon the influential work 
of H.L.A. Hart and aligns with my focus upon the popular acceptance of legal norms and 
principles. Id. at 1790–92, 1805–06, 1825, 1848. 
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Roberts stems in part from his place in the Court’s history as the first Supreme Court 
nominee since Justice Breyer’s nomination more than a decade earlier, his arrival 
marked the start of the “Roberts Court” in 2005.16 Beyond this, Chief Justice 
Roberts’ hearings were also notable for his famous comparison of judges to 
umpires—a catch-phrase or slogan that was widely-repeated in the aftermath of his 
elevation to the Court.17 Similar reasons account for my focus on Justice 
Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings and debates. Aside from the appeal of her 
providing some partisan balance as a Democratic nominee alongside the 
Republican-nominated Chief Justice Roberts, judicial impartiality was also front-
and-center in her nomination due to her references to race, bias, and the perspective 
of a “wise Latina” in a prior speech that became a focal point of Senate questioning 
and discussion.18 What emerges from this discussion in Part II is an apparent 
divergence between Democrats and Republicans: while Democrats tended to believe 
that judicial impartiality demands the judicial recognition of certain social facts 
about the parties involved in a case, Republicans consistently endorsed a view of 
judicial impartiality as demanding a more universal, general application of the law. 
With this foundation in place for understanding judicial impartiality both 
conceptually and within political discourse, I move on in Part III to examine 
divergent Democratic and Republican views of judicial impartiality. In this Part, I 
elaborate on two of the three main claims of this paper: first, I claim that the 
divergent Democratic and Republican views on judicial impartiality, as illustrated 
in Part II, are rooted in their distinct electoral coalitions and ideological histories. 
However, I also make a second claim that, notwithstanding these divergences, both 
Democratic and Republican justices on the Supreme Court share a common 
institutional environment at present of judicial uncertainty. This shared condition, I 
argue, ultimately alters how Democratic and Republican-appointed justices can 
implement their respective visions of judicial impartiality in actual adjudication.  
Part IV provides some tentative support for the preceding point, where I discuss 
some of the Roberts Court’s recent rulings on race and equal protection, to help 
anchor this examination of judicial impartiality in an especially relevant body of 
constitutional doctrine. I offer a selective examination of some of the highest-profile 
race and equal protection cases decided by the Roberts Court thus far: Parents 
                                               
16 Maura Reynolds, Roberts Is Sworn in as Chief Justice, L.A. TIMES (Sep. 30, 2005), 
https://www.latimes.com/archives/la-xpm-2005-sep-30-na-roberts30-story.html [https:// 
perma.cc/J75A-ABE9] (acknowledging that Roberts was “the first new appointee to the 
court in more than a decade”). See Ballotpedia, History of the Supreme Court, BALLOTPEDIA, 
(last visited June 30, 2019), https://ballotpedia.org/History_of_the_Supreme_Court 
[https://perma.cc/WQZ7-6FYV] (listing the “Roberts Court” as the current among other eras 
of the Supreme Court). 
17 Indeed, it was a point of discussion in Sonia Sotomayor’s confirmation hearings and 
debates four years later. See infra Section II.B. Mark Tushnet notes that the umpire metaphor 
has since been a cause for mild regret from Roberts in subsequent years. MARK TUSHNET, IN 
THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT 72 (2013). 
18 See infra Part II.B.  
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Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,19 Fisher v. 
University of Texas (Fisher I),20 and Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher II)21 and 
Schuette v. BAMN.22 This discussion will demonstrate how, within the context of 
actual adjudication, the present political context inescapably alters how partisan 
ideals of judicial impartiality are applied by sitting Supreme Court justices. 
Finally, in Part V, my argument takes a normative turn. In that Part, I set forth 
my third and final claim: accepting that some degree of partiality is realistically 
inevitable in the judicial role, judicial impartiality is best understood as denoting a 
consistent, good-faith engagement with the claims and interests of those who lie 
outside the social groups that are aligned with a judicial actor.23 I conclude the 
Article with a few words on what this conception of judicial impartiality might 
imply, or even demand, of Democratic and Republican-appointed judicial actors 
seeking to uphold the ideal of judicial impartiality in the present context. 
 
I.  GENERALITY AND PARTIALITY 
 
As noted in the preceding section, my focus on judicial impartiality centers on 
a more specific question in relation to that concept: namely, whether judicial 
impartiality or judicial fairness demands attentiveness or ignorance of social facts 
about the parties in a given case. Before delving into the nuances and complexities 
of thoughtful answers to this question in the context of actual adjudication, we might 
first probe this issue in more abstract, conceptual terms by thinking about two more 
principled answers.  
One answer is that judicial impartiality demands no recognition of any social 
facts about the parties appearing before a judge.24 This perspective would equate 
judicial impartiality with a demand for generality in the application of the law. 
Another answer might emphasize the necessity of judges taking such social facts 
into account.25 This perspective would thus suggest that judicial impartiality, 
properly understood, demands at least some degree of partiality or differential 
treatment of individuals under the law. Hence, at first glance, a conceptual fuzziness 
may emerge when individuals invoke “partiality” as necessary to judicial im-
partiality. However, this oddity may easily be explained once we recognize that 
speakers often have “judicial fairness” in mind when they invoke “judicial 
                                               
19 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
20 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013). 
21 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
22 134 S.Ct. 1623 (2014). 
23 Aligning with this point, Geyh notes that “[i]f perfect impartiality is unattainable, the 
more pragmatic objective is to ensure that judges are ‘impartial enough’ to fulfill the role 
assigned them under state and federal constitutions: to uphold the rule of law.” Geyh, supra 
note 8, at 497. 
24 See infra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
25 See infra notes 34–42 and accompanying text. 
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impartiality.”26 Thus, contrary to the common image, under the latter view Lady 
Justice should not be blind, but should instead be sensitive to context, structure, and 
relevant social facts. 
Each perspective possesses distinct attributes, so let us consider generality first. 
Perhaps the core normative appeal of generality in the law lies in the promise of 
regularized, equal treatment. General and consistent application of legal principles 
by judicial actors ensures that similar cases will be treated alike, and individuals will 
be treated fairly and equally regardless of (supposedly) irrelevant characteristics 
such as ancestry, wealth, race, gender, sexual orientation, or other markers of social 
status.27 The intrinsic appeal of generality is such that it is closely identified among 
scholars and non-scholars with other similarly weighty normative commitments 
such as the rule-of-law and rule-formalism.28 
For example, Lon Fuller famously identified eight elements required for a 
system of law to exist, and the first was a requirement of generality in legal rules. 
Generality ensures that a legal basis for a decision or action in a given case 
necessarily has applicability beyond the case in question to other similar cases.29 A 
similar orientation is apparent in Herbert Wechsler’s likewise-famous call for 
“neutral principles” to guide Supreme Court decision-making—a point he made in 
relation to his critique of the Brown v. Board of Education30 ruling. As Wechsler 
stated, 
 
I put it to you that the main constituent of the judicial process is precisely 
that it must be genuinely principled, resting with respect to every step that 
is involved in reaching judgment on analysis and reasons quite 
transcending the immediate result that is achieved. To be sure, the courts 
decide, or should decide, only the case they have before them. But must 
they not decide on grounds of adequate neutrality and generality, tested 
not only by the instant application but by others that the principles imply? 
Is it not the very essence of judicial method to insist upon attending to such 
other cases, preferably those involving an opposing interest, in evaluating 
any principle avowed?31  
 
                                               
26 For an example of this, see infra note 75 (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
27 See infra notes 29–33 and accompanying text. 
28 Id. 
29 LON L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 38–39, 46–49, 110, 210 (Rev. Ed. 1969). 
Interestingly, Fuller’s requirement of generality via legal rules was focused more on the 
notion of equal treatment across similar cases, and less on the related, but as he saw it, distinct 
problem of legal rules that targeted specific individuals or classes of individuals. Id. at 47–
48. 
30 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
31 Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV. L. 
REV. 1, 15 (1959). 
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Numerous scholars since Fuller have emphasized the equality benefits inherent in 
the judicial utilization of categorical rules, as opposed to more flexible standards, in 
deciding legal cases.32 Cass Sunstein, for example, makes these points simply: 
 
Rules are associated with impartiality. Their impartiality is captured in the 
notion that the Goddess justice is blindfolded. Rules are blind to many 
features of a case that might otherwise be relevant and that are relevant in 
some social contexts—religion, social class, good looks, height, and so 
forth—and also to many things on whose relevance people have great 
difficulty agreeing. . . . A comparative disadvantage of rule-free decisions 
is that they increase the risk that illegitimate considerations will influence 
decisions. . . . With rules, people who are similarly situated are more likely 
to be similarly treated.33 
 
Notwithstanding these well-known virtues of generality in the law, it also 
possesses some well-known potential drawbacks. These items of concern, in turn, 
speak to the virtues of partiality in the orientation and application of the law. For 
example, consider the goals of equality and equal treatment again. If it is easy to see 
how these purposes might be effectuated with general rules and blind application of 
the law, it is also not hard to see how these goals might be subverted by them as 
well. A general legal rule or a mechanical administration of the law might, for 
example, undermine equality goals by failing to take into account compelling moral 
or sociological differences between cases or individuals—thus leading to 
superficially equal outcomes that mask dramatic inequities.34  
To take a familiar example from equal protection doctrine, one might consider 
the case of affirmative action policies in higher education admissions. Such policies’ 
prolonged existence in American society signals, at the least, a degree of discomfort 
among higher educational administrators—and, one might presume, American 
society more broadly—with basing admissions solely on ostensibly neutral criteria 
like standardized test scores or high school GPAs. A general system of higher 
educational admissions based solely on these numerical indicators would seemingly 
be impartial and ensure superficially equal treatment for all. Because of 
socioeconomic advantages and disadvantages that accrue to different segments of 
                                               
32 See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 104–05, 
112–13 (1996); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., “The Rule of Law” as a Concept in Constitutional 
Discourse, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 8–9, 14–18 (1997) [hereinafter Fallon, “Rule of Law”]; 
Margaret Jane Radin, Reconsidering the Rule of Law, 69 B.U. L. REV. 781, 785–86, 791–92 
(1989); Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175, 1178 
(1989); Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 506, 540, 543 (1988); Kathleen M. 
Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 62 (1992). 
33 SUNSTEIN, supra note 32, at 104–05, 112–13. 
34 Id. at 113, 117–18, 132; Schauer, supra note 32, at 540, 543–44; Sullivan, supra note 
32, at 62. 
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American youth in elementary and secondary education,35 and because standardized 
test scores might reflect such disadvantages and benefits, such a system of 
admissions would still strike many as inequitable despite this apparent equality of 
treatment.36 
At least within the context of contemporary constitutional law, probably the 
most conspicuous examples of partiality in the law are those instances where judicial 
actors evaluate status-based classifications under equal protection-scrutiny analysis 
and apply different levels of scrutiny to different types of classifications.37 Within 
these rulings, the doctrine applied by judges recognizes and is indeed constituted by, 
the presence of certain social characteristics residing within the challenged law or 
within the claims of litigants. More generally, partiality in the law often appears 
where judicial actors might deploy more flexible (or more judicial-discretion-
friendly) standards to allow for the subjects involved, and the specifics of the case 
at hand, to influence the legal outcome.38 Thus, to offer one well-known example, 
Justice Ginsburg articulated the following doctrinal principle for evaluating gender-
based classifications in the case of United States v. Virginia,39 where the Court struck 
down the Virginia Military Institute’s exclusion of female students as an 
unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause: 
 
To summarize the Court’s current directions for cases of official 
classification based on gender: Focusing on the differential treatment for 
denial of opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must 
determine whether the proffered justification is “exceedingly persuasive.” 
The burden of justification is demanding[,] and it rests entirely on the 
State. The State must show “at least that the [challenged] classification 
serves ‘important governmental objectives and that the discriminatory 
means employed’ are ‘substantially related to the achievement of those 
                                               
35 For an insightful and in-depth examination of the various challenges faced in the 
public school system of Newark, New Jersey, and the various reform strategies that public 
school reformers have recently tried there, see Dale Russakoff, Schooled, THE NEW YORKER 
(May 12, 2014), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2014/05/19/schooled [https://perma 
.cc/9T8L-TE83]. 
36 This invokes the familiar image of a “fair” foot-race articulated by Lyndon Johnson: 
“You do not take a person who, for years, has been hobbled by chains and liberate him, bring 
him up to the starting line of a race and then say, ‘you are free to compete with all the others,’ 
and still justly believe that you have been completely fair.” President Lyndon B. Johnson, 
Commencement Address at Howard University: To Fulfill These Rights (June 4, 1965), 
https://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/commencement-address-at-howard-
university-to-fulfill-these-rights/ [https://perma.cc/73J6-WH34]. 
37 On the three tiers of scrutiny analysis between rationality review, intermediate 
scrutiny, and strict scrutiny, see STUART CHINN, RECALIBRATING REFORM: THE LIMITS OF 
POLITICAL CHANGE 272 (2014). 
38 Sullivan, supra note 32, at 58–59, 66. 
39 518 U.S. 515 (1996). 
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objectives.’” The justification must be genuine, not hypothesized or 
invented post hoc in response to litigation. And it must not rely on 
overbroad generalizations about the different talents, capacities, or 
preferences of males and females.40 
 
Finally, even though the previous example of partiality speaks to a modern 
sensibility about suspect classes that is familiar in contemporary constitutional law,41 
the basic idea of partiality in the law is by no means limited to this context. Indeed, 
whether the focus is on legal rules regarding who is eligible to vote in which 
elections, or the scope of an individual’s various tax obligations, or legal standards 
such as the tiers of scrutiny in equal protection doctrine, partiality is inevitable in 
the law—at least in the minimal sense that the law and the judicial application of it 
almost always function to treat some individuals differently than others because of 
certain social facts.42  
Thus, most of us would hardly find it worthy of concern that a state might 
restrict automobile drivers to those at or above a certain age limit. Such a law and 
the age classification contained within it would reflect a governmental partiality 
toward people at or above that age who wish to drive, and a disfavoring of those 
below the age limit who wish to drive. Of course, partiality in the sense of an age 
restriction on driving is a rather mild case, and it would not run afoul of Fuller’s 
requirement that the law must be composed of general rules either: everyone in the 
state would be equally subject to such a law.  
Still, the example underscores at least one point relevant for subsequent 
discussion: the conspicuous presence of generality and partiality themes in common-
place examples like age limits on driving suggests the utility of thinking about these 
concepts as situated on a continuum. It should not be surprising that the most 
normatively defensible perspectives on judicial impartiality will often be positioned 
in the middle, given the normative qualms raised by taking either view to the 
extreme. Extreme generality poses the troubling concern about potential blindness 
to morally and sociologically-relevant differences among subjects and cases.43 At 
                                               
40 Id. at 532–33 (citations omitted). 
41 The conventional starting point, doctrinally, for this sensibility is the famous footnote 
4 in United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (citations omitted) 
(“Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review of statutes 
directed at particular religious, or national, or racial minorities; whether prejudice against 
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends seriously to curtail 
the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities, 
and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.”). 
42 As Tussman and tenBroek put it in their classic article on equal protection: “Here, 
then, is a paradox: The equal protection of the laws is a ‘pledge of the protection of equal 
laws.’ But laws may classify. And ‘the very idea of classification is that of inequality.’” 
Joseph Tussman & Jacobus tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. REV. 
341, 344 (1949). 
43 See supra notes 34–36 and accompanying text.  
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the same time, excessive partiality at the other end can introduce different concerns 
such as the specter of corruption, self-dealing, nepotism, and the absence of any of 
the benefits of regularity and generality offered by legal rules.44  
 
II.  SENATE DEBATES OVER THE ROBERTS AND SOTOMAYOR SUPREME COURT 
NOMINATIONS 
 
With some conceptual preliminaries out of the way, the more central questions 
in this Article lie in understanding how generality and partiality themes intersect 
with prevailing notions of judicial impartiality. As an initial step in gaining some 
insight into this question, I examine the Supreme Court confirmation hearings and 
debates for Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Sonia Sotomayor. My general 
interest in focusing on Supreme Court nominations is perhaps not hard to intuit: 
there are few better contemporary contexts for seeing a public dialogue on legal and 
judicial legitimacy than a Supreme Court nomination.45 To the extent we can 
reasonably assume legislators will say things that resonate with their voters—if only 
at the least, to aid their hopes for reelection46—we can likewise realistically assume 
that the ideas and arguments that appear in these nomination efforts are generally 
ones that would resonate with at least some substantial portion of American voters. 
Likewise, for similar reasons, we might presume that the ideas and arguments that 
do not enjoy ready affirmation and endorsement in these dialogues are generally not 
ones that enjoy intense support from substantial portions of the electorate. 
In the sections that follow, I focus on the arguments about generality and 
partiality that appear in these confirmation hearings and debates. My use of two case 
studies was to ensure a broader look at the relevant questions and themes while 
minimizing the effects of the peculiarities of a single case. Further, a benefit of 
pairing one nominee by a Republican president (George W. Bush) and one nominee 
                                               
44 Hence this phrase by Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison is often taken as a basic 
description of the rule of law: “The government of the United States has been emphatically 
termed a government of laws, and not of men.” 5 U.S. 137, 163 (1803). See also Frank 
Michelman, Law’s Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1499–1501 (1988) (stating that American 
constitutionalism is based on the premise “that the American people are politically free 
insomuch as they are governed by laws and not men”); Fallon, “Rule of Law,” supra note 
32, at 2–3; Radin, supra note 32, at 781. 
45 See Mark V. Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique of Interpretivism 
and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 782 (1983) (noting that the confirmation 
process is, like most rituals, “important primarily because it reveals to us some of the deep 
assumptions prevalent in the culture.”). 
46 See DAVID R. MAYHEW, CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION 11–78 (1974) 
(“Congress has declined into a battle for individual survival. Each of the Congressmen and 
each of the Senators has the attitude: ‘I’ve got to look out for myself.’ . . . Most of them are 
willing only to follow those things that will protect them and give them the coloration which 
allows them to blend into their respective districts or their respective states. If you don’t stick 
your neck out, you don’t get it chopped off.”) (citation omitted). 
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by a Democratic president (Barack Obama) is that it allows for an examination of 
each political party’s arguments within two distinct contexts: when each party was 
aligned with a nominating president, and when each party was not aligned with the 
nominating president.47 In addition, given that the Roberts nomination occurred in 
2005 and the Sotomayor nomination occurred in 2009, we have two case-studies 
transpiring somewhat close to each other in the recent past, thus ensuring a 
reasonably solid, contemporary examination of these themes. 
Finally, most importantly, I focused on Roberts and Sotomayor specifically 
because the themes of impartiality and partiality were central points of discussion in 
both of their confirmation efforts. Roberts’s reference to judges as “umpires,”48 for 
example, garnered a great deal of attention during his hearings in front of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee and in the broader debate in the Senate.49 Likewise, a focal 
point for skeptics of Sotomayor during her hearings were references to identity 
politics in a speech she gave at U.C. Berkeley Law School in 2001,50 which 
intersected with a statement by then-Senator Obama on the importance of empathy 
in Supreme Court nominees during the Roberts confirmation.51 
My approach was to review both the Roberts and Sotomayor confirmation 
hearings in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee, and the confirmation debates 
on both justices in the full Senate, looking for discussion of generality, partiality, 
and judicial impartiality by the nominees or the Senators. Since my focus was on 
grasping the complexities and subtleties in how these ideals were invoked, I focused 
less on exhaustively documenting each reference to these principles, and more on 
context-sensitive readings of the most extensive and substantive references to these 
themes. As will be clear, certain Senators loom a little larger than others in these 
discussions. 
 
A.  Defenses, Critiques, and Elaborations on Impartiality  
in the Roberts Nomination 
 
Perhaps the least surprising finding from a review of the confirmation hearings 
of Justice Roberts is the strong link between judicial impartiality and generality 
within the broader discourse. In perhaps the most commonly-referenced line in his 
                                               
47 The partisan makeup of the Senate for the Roberts Confirmation was 44 Democrats, 
55 Republicans, and 1 Independent. The partisan makeup for the Sotomayor nomination was 
57 Democrats, 41 Republicans, and 2 Independents. See Party Division, UNITED STATES 
SENATE (June 23, 2019), https://www.senate.gov/history/partydiv.htm [https://perma.cc/J67 
E-FHTH]. 
48 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be Chief Justice 
of the United States, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) [hereinafter Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing] 
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States). 
49 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 21408 (2005) (statement of Sen. Sessions). 
50 These remarks were published in Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge’s Voice, 13 
BERKELEY LA RAZA L.J. 87 (2002). 
51 151 CONG. REC. 21032 (2005) (statement of Sen. Obama). 
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testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Roberts stated this about the 
judicial role: 
 
My personal appreciation that I owe a great debt to others reinforces my 
view that a certain humility should characterize the judicial role. Judges 
and Justices are servants of the law, not the other way around. Judges are 
like umpires. Umpires don’t make the rules, they apply them. The role of 
an umpire and a judge is critical. They make sure everybody plays by the 
rules, but it is a limited role. Nobody ever went to a ball game to see the 
umpire.52  
 
He subsequently stated the following in an exchange with Senator Grassley (R-IA): 
 
Judge ROBERTS. He [Alexander Hamilton] said judges should not have 
an absolute discretion; they need to be bound down by rules and 
precedents—the rules, the laws that you pass, the precedents that judges 
before them have shaped. And then their job is interpreting the law. It is 
not making the law. And so long as they are being confined by the laws, 
by the Constitution, by the precedents, then you’re more comfortable that 
you’re exercising the judicial function. It’s when you’re at sea, and you 
don’t have anything to look to that you need to begin to worry that this 
isn’t what judges are supposed to do.  
 
Senator GRASSLEY. Well, is there any room in constitutional 
interpretation for the judge’s own values or beliefs?  
 
Judge ROBERTS. No, I don’t think there is. Sometimes it’s hard to give 
meaning to a constitutional term in a particular case. But you don’t look 
to your own values and beliefs. You look outside yourself to other sources. 
This is the basis for, you know, that judges wear black robes, because it 
doesn’t matter who they are as individuals. That’s not going to shape their 
decision. It’s their understanding of the law that will shape their decision.53  
 
We might see within these comments several significant themes. The first is a view 
of the law as objectively clear—like the rules of a sporting contest. Second, Roberts 
also offered an endorsement of judicial modesty and limiting judicial discretion, 
made possible in part by the clarity of the law and legal rules. 
Third, there are implications for the treatment of individuals and groups that 
also flow from the umpire analogy. Given the modest role for judges that Roberts 
expressed, one ready implication is to see judges engaged in ensuring a kind of 
                                               
52 Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing, supra note 48 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., 
Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States). 
53 Id. at 177–78 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the 
United States and Sen. Charles Grassley, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary). 
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fairness: the equal treatment of all individuals under general rules. In response to a 
comment by Senator Durbin (D-IL)—a point that I will return to below—Roberts 
stated the following: 
 
[S]omebody asked me, you know, “Are you going to be on the side of the 
little guy?” And you obviously want to give an immediate answer, but as 
you reflect on it, if the Constitution says that the little guy should win, the 
little guy is going to win in court before me. But if the Constitution says 
that the big guy should win, well, then, the big guy is going to win, because 
my obligation is to the Constitution. That’s the oath. The oath that a judge 
takes is not that I will look out for particular interests, I’ll be on the side 
of particular interests. The oath is to uphold the Constitution and laws of 
the United States, and that’s what I would do.54  
 
All three themes were subsequently emphasized in the debates over the Roberts 
nomination within the full Senate. With respect to the umpire analogy, that line was 
thoroughly referenced throughout by a number of Senators,55 along with additional 
elaboration on the proper modesty that should be attached to the judicial role. For 
example, as then-Senator Jeff Sessions (R-AL) stated in a straightforward reference 
to impartiality and the neutrality of general rules: 
 
I saw Senator BURNS here. He used to be a football referee. I wanted to 
ask him: Senator BURNS. if you thought that the holding call was a little 
bit inadvertent and it wasn’t too bad a holding call but the penalty called 
for 15 yards, should the referee be free to impose 10 yards because they 
think that might be more fair? No. Of course, not. Those are the basic 
principles of rules.56 
 
With regard to the commitment to equal treatment, Senator Hatch (R-UT) referenced 
the above-noted comment by Roberts and was emphatic in affirming that view. For 
Hatch, the requirement of equal treatment across all persons via general rules was 
                                               
54 Id. at 448 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the 
United States). 
55 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 21191 (2005) (statement of Sen. Frist (R-TN)); 151 CONG. 
REC. 21207 (2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch (R-UT)); 151 CONG. REC. 21389 (2005) 
(statement of Sen. Smith (R-OR)); 151 CONG. REC. 21399 (2005) (statement of Sen. Burns 
(R-MT)); 151 CONG. REC. 21404 (2005) (statement of Sen. Talent (R-MO)); 151 CONG. REC. 
21405 (2005) (statement of Sen. Thune (R-SD)); 151 CONG. REC. 21407 (2005) (statement 
of Sen. Vitter (R-LA)); 151 CONG. REC. 21631 (2005) (statement of Sen. Lott (R-MS)); 151 
CONG. REC. 21407 (2005) (statement of Sen. Bunning (R-KY)); 151 CONG. REC. 21417 
(2005) (statement of Sen. Bennett (R-UT)); 151 CONG. REC. 21425 (2005) (statement of Sen. 
Grassley (R-IA)).  
56 151 CONG. REC. 21408 (2005) (statement of Sen. Sessions); see also 151 CONG. REC. 
21206 (2005) (statement of Sen. DeWine (R-OH)). 
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so obviously correct that he wondered how anyone could possibly stake out a critical 
or opposing view. As he stated,  
 
If my friends on the other side oppose this nomination, are they saying that 
judges should instead be partial, that judges should actually take sides, that 
people coming before the Court do not deserve the confidence that judges 
will be fair? If that is what they believe, I invite them to try to make that 
case to the American people. If not, if they agree with Judge Roberts that 
judges should be impartial, then they should confirm his nomination.  
. . .  
 
If my friends on the other side oppose this nomination, are they arguing 
that whoever the little guy might be must win, regardless of what the facts 
and regardless of what the law requires? Are they saying judges should 
disregard their oaths to do justice without respect to persons?57 
 
Nevertheless, at least three themes run through the comments of those 
somewhat more skeptical of the Roberts nomination and the arguments he put forth 
in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee. Perhaps the most noteworthy critical 
comment came from then-Senator Obama (D-IL), which encompassed critiques of 
all three themes noted by Roberts supporters: the image of the law as objectively 
clear; the claim of minimal discretion by judges in applying the law to specific cases; 
and the purported fairness of such an approach to judging. As Obama noted in a 
comment that explained his vote against Roberts’s nomination—and that 
subsequently reappeared with a vengeance by critics of Sonia Sotomayor’s 
nomination four years later58—he memorably stated: 
 
The problem I face—a problem that has been voiced by some of my other 
colleagues, both those who are voting for Mr. Roberts and those who are 
voting against Mr. Roberts—is that while adherence to legal precedent and 
rules of statutory or constitutional construction will dispose of 95 percent 
of the cases that come before a court, so that both a Scalia and a Ginsburg 
will arrive at the same place most of the time on those 95 percent of the 
cases—what matters on the Supreme Court is those 5 percent of cases that 
are truly difficult. In those cases, adherence to precedent and rules of 
construction and interpretation will only get you through the 25th mile of 
the marathon. That last mile can only be determined on the basis of one’s 
                                               
57 151 CONG. REC. 21208 (2005) (statement of Sen. Hatch). See also 151 CONG. REC. 
21414, 21415 (2005) (statement of Sen. Cornyn (R-TX)); 151 CONG. REC. 21633 (2005) 
(statement of Sen. Bond (R-MO)); 151 CONG. REC. 21643, 21644 (2005) (statement of Sen. 
McConnell (R-KY)). 
58 See infra notes 70–73 and accompanying text. 
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deepest values, one’s core concerns, one’s broader perspectives on how 
the world works, and the depth and breadth of one’s empathy.59  
 
Obama thus introduced concerns about the objectivity of the law and Roberts’s claim 
that proper judging entails minimal judicial discretion. Rather, Obama invoked the 
possibility of “hard cases”60 to underscore the point that the conventional tools of 
legal analysis may very well be unable to give us determinate answers in the types 
of very difficult cases that the Supreme Court is likely to hear. If one accepts 
Obama’s claim that a degree of indeterminacy may exist with conventional methods 
of legal analysis, this in turn inevitably prompts skepticism about a second 
component of the Roberts claim: that the judicial role requires minimal discretion 
because the application of the law to a given case is generally nothing more than 
calling “balls and strikes.” To the contrary, if legal analysis—and the content of the 
law itself—may be characterized by a degree of indeterminacy, then any correct 
evaluation of the judicial role has to grapple with the fact of inevitable judicial 
discretion, and better or worse ways of applying that discretion by judges. Third, 
this in turn led to Obama’s invocation of “empathy” as a necessary element of the 
judicial application of the law. 
Beyond Obama, probably the most interesting comment that directly took aim 
at Roberts’s view of the law and the judicial role was a comment by then-Senator 
Joe Biden (D-DE) in the Senate Judiciary Committee Hearings. As Senator Biden 
stated: 
 
[I]n major league baseball, they have a rule—Rule 2.00 defines the strike 
zone. It basically says from the shoulders to the knees. And the only 
question about judges is, “do they have good eyesight or not?” They don’t 
get to change the strike zone. They don’t get to say that was down around 
the ankles, you know, and I think it was a strike. They don’t get to do that.  
 
But you are in a very different position as a Supreme Court Justice. As you 
pointed out, some places of the Constitution define the strike zone—two-
thirds of the Senators must vote, you must be an American citizen, to the 
chagrin of Arnold Schwarzenegger, to be President of the United States—
I mean born in America to be a President of the United States. They are 
all—the strike zone is set out. But as you pointed out in the question of 
Senator Hatch, I think you said unreasonable search and seizure; what 
constitutes unreasonable?  
. . .  
 
And the same thing prevails for a lot of other parts of the Constitution. The 
one that we are all talking about and everybody here from left, right, and 
center is concerned about is the Liberty Clause of the 14th Amendment. It 
                                               
59 151 CONG. REC. 21032 (2005) (statement of Sen. Obama). 
60 RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 81–83 (1977). 
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doesn’t define it. All the things we debate about here, and the Court 
debates, the 5–4 decisions, they are almost all on issues that are ennobling 
phrases in the Constitution that the Founders never set a strike zone for. 
You get to go back and decide . . . .61  
 
If one proceeds from the view that application of the law encompasses 
indeterminacy—and that judicial discretion is inevitable in this task—then one 
returns to the conclusion of Obama’s statement: the need for an articulated standard 
by which we might evaluate better or more legitimate applications of judicial 
discretion.  
Again, for Obama, the standard he emphasized was one linked to the 
incorporation of empathy by judges in making legal judgments—or more 
specifically, Obama endorsed a view of the judicial role where judges would show 
a special solicitude for the less powerful and less fortunate.62 Others seized on this 
theme to reject the Roberts view, and the view of his supporters, that proper and fair 
judging required blindness to these social facts.63 One of the more eloquent 
statements in this regard was by Senator Durbin (D-IL) during the Judiciary 
Committee hearings: 
 
[S]o frequently, when asked, you have said, appropriately, that you will be 
driven and inspired by the rule of law, which is an appropriate term but a 
hard and cold term by itself. We know you have the great legal mind and 
have proven it here. But the questions that have been asked more and more 
today really want to know what is in your heart, and I think those are 
appropriate.  
 
When you look down from the bench or read a trial transcript, do you just 
see plaintiffs and parties and precedents, or more? Do you see the people 
behind the precedents, the families behind the footnotes? I think that is 
what many of us are driving at with these questions.  
 
                                               
61 Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing, supra note 48, at 185 (statement of Sen. Joseph 
Biden, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary); see also id. at 512–13 (statement of Peter 
B. Edelman, Professor of Law, Co-Director, Joint Degree in Law and Public Policy, 
Georgetown University Law Center, Washington, D.C.). 
62 151 CONG. REC. 21032 (2005) (statement of Sen. Obama).  
63 See, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 21389, 21390 (2005) (statement of Sen. Harkin (D-IA)); 
151 CONG. REC. 21429 (2005) (statement of Sen. Inouye (D-HI)); 151 CONG. REC. 21431 
(2005) (statement of Sen. Clinton (D-NY)); 151 CONG. REC. 21630 (2005) (statement of Sen. 
Kennedy (D-MA)); 151 CONG. REC. 21630 (2005) (statement of Sen. Schumer (D-NY)); 151 
CONG. REC. 21632 (2005) (statement of Sen. Akaka) (D-HI); 151 CONG. REC. 21637 (2005) 
(statement of Sen. Corzine (D-NJ)); 151 CONG. REC. 21639 (2005) (statement of Sen. 
Stabenow (D-MI)). 
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You have lived a comfortable life. Court cases often involve people who 
have not. Many times, contests between the powerful and the powerless, 
as someone said in the opening statement, are contests where the 
powerless just have the rule of law and the Constitution on their side, 
praying for relief for their day in court.  
 
Aside from a few pro bono cases, as important as they are—and I salute 
you for being involved in them—what would the powerless, the 
disenfranchised, minorities, and others see in your life experience that 
would lead them to believe that they would have a fighting chance in your 
Court?64  
 
Encompassed within Durbin’s statement, and others with the same view,65 was the 
presumption that judicial and legal legitimacy rests on something beyond the 
aspiration toward pure procedural neutrality; more precisely, and more importantly, 
it rests on substantive outcomes that positively impact the welfare of the 
disadvantaged in American society. In other words, Durbin was invoking the 
legitimacy of partiality, when deployed toward equitable goals. 
Finally, before moving on to the Sotomayor nomination, it is worth 
emphasizing some narrow points of commonality that might still be identified 
between the positions staked out by Roberts and his supporters, and the positions 
staked out by skeptics. First, recall the response by Roberts to the query from Senator 
Grassley about whether “there [is] any room in constitutional interpretation for the 
judge’s own values or beliefs?” Roberts’s reply, again, was:  
 
No, I don’t think there is. Sometimes it’s hard to give meaning to a 
constitutional term in a particular case. But you don’t look to your own 
values and beliefs. You look outside yourself to other sources. This is the 
basis for, you know, that judges wear black robes, because it doesn’t 
matter who they are as individuals. That’s not going to shape their 
decision. It’s their understanding of the law that will shape their decision.66  
 
Roberts appeared to partially concede the point raised by Obama that legal 
indeterminacy exists and that the conventional tools of legal analysis cannot 
necessarily eliminate it. Furthermore, one suspects that Obama and other skeptics 
would concede the assertion made by Roberts that judges should not feel free to 
simply inject their own moral beliefs into legal interpretation without any sense of 
professional or ethical constraint. The gap between these two perspectives lies, 
however, with Roberts’s insistence that one’s understanding of the law can be 
                                               
64 Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing, supra note 48, at 388 (statement of Sen. Richard 
Durbin, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary). 
65 See infra note 71. 
66 Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing, supra note 48, at 177–78 (statement of John G. 
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States). 
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wholly separated from one’s values and beliefs. One suspects that for Obama and 
others more comfortable with acknowledging the fact of judicial discretion, the idea 
that one’s view of the law may indeed be linked to one’s larger values (about the 
purpose of the Constitution, or the purpose of the American polity, or the meaning 
of equality) would be neither surprising nor necessarily problematic. 
Second, in response to a question from Senator Kyl (R-AZ) on the umpire 
analogy, Roberts stated: 
 
I know there are those theorists who think that is futile [to reach the “right” 
legal answer], or because it is hard in particular cases, we should just throw 
up our hands and not try in any case, and I do not subscribe to that. I 
believe that there are right answers, and judges, if they work hard enough, 
are likely to come up with them.67  
 
Again, most of Roberts’s skeptics would likely have concurred with the view that 
there are indeed “right” answers to legal questions, so this comment perhaps 
minimized a point of likely convergence with them. Where there may have been 
divergence was in the disinclination of Roberts to acknowledge, as his skeptics 
might have, that there may be multiple right answers to a legal question, or that some 
answers may be relatively better than others. As such, having faith that there are 
correct legal answers does not eliminate having to potentially grapple with the 
complexities of judicial discretion, notwithstanding what Roberts appeared to 
suggest.  
Third and finally, Roberts and Senator Durbin had an interesting exchange on 
how the latter viewed the equality implications flowing from the former’s “neutral” 
view of judging. In response to the comment mentioned above by Roberts that he 
would rule in favor of “the little guy” or “the big guy” depending upon what the 
Constitution commanded, Durbin responded with the following comment: 
 
Would you at least concede that you would take into consideration that in 
our system of justice the race goes to the swift, and the swift are those with 
the resources, the money, the lawyers, the power in the system, and that 
many times the powerless, the person who has struggled and clawed their 
way to your courtroom, went through a wall of adversity which the 
powerful never had to face? Is that part of your calculation?68  
 
Roberts responded by saying: 
 
                                               
67 Id. at 267 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the 
United States). 
68 Id. at 448 (statement of Sen. Richard Durbin, Member, Senate Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
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Absolutely, and it is, again, what’s carved above the doors to the Supreme 
Court: “Equal Justice Under Law.” And the judicial oath talks about doing 
justice without regard to persons, to rich and to poor. And that, of course, 
is critically important . . . the judge’s obligation is to appreciate that the 
rule of law requires that both of those be treated equally under the law.69 
 
Thus, even if Roberts steadfastly refused to recognize any room for partiality or 
special solicitude for the less fortunate in the legitimate exercise of judicial power, 
he and Durbin at least converged on the notion of equal access to justice and equal 
treatment for both rich and poor. 
 
B.  Defenses, Critiques, and Elaborations on Impartiality  
in the Sotomayor Nomination 
 
Picking up on his comments emphasizing the importance of empathy during 
the Roberts nomination, President Obama stated the following in announcing the 
retirement of Justice David Souter and his hopes for the next Supreme Court justice: 
 
I will seek someone who understands that justice isn’t about some abstract 
legal theory or footnote in a case book. It is also about how our laws affect 
the daily realities of people’s lives -- whether they can make a living and 
care for their families; whether they feel safe in their homes and welcome 
in their own nation. 
 
I view that quality of empathy, of understanding and identifying with 
people’s hopes and struggles as an essential ingredient for arriving at [sic] 
just decisions and outcomes. I will seek somebody who is dedicated to the 
rule of law, who honors our constitutional traditions, who respects the 
integrity of the judicial process and the appropriate limits of the judicial 
role.70 
 
Sonia Sotomayor was ultimately the nominee, and during her confirmation, those 
Senators who supported her tended to emphasize a range of arguments that spoke to 
the legitimacy of partiality in legal interpretation and as part of the judicial role. The 
first set of arguments tracked Obama’s comments from both the Roberts nomination 
and from his retirement announcement of Justice Souter: recognizing that judicial 
discretion is part of the judicial role, and emphasizing the need for judges and 
justices who would utilize this discretion with an eye to the lived experience of 
                                               
69 Id. at 448–49 (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the 
United States). 
70 Obama’s Remarks on the Resignation of Justice Souter, reprinted in N.Y. TIMES, 
(May 1, 2009), https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/01/us/politics/01souter.text.html 
[https://perma.cc/949F-W5RN] 
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“regular” individuals—especially disadvantaged individuals.71 As Senator 
Whitehouse (D-RI) stated on this:  
 
Setting aside all this [sic] politics, we should also never forget, never 
overlook the historic role that judges play in protecting the less powerful 
among us. We should always appreciate how a real-world understanding 
of the real-life impact of judicial decisions is a proper and necessary part 
of the process of judging.  
Judge Sotomayor’s wide experience, I hope, will bring her a sense of the 
difficult circumstances faced by the less powerful among us. . . If Justice 
Sotomayor’s wide experience gives her empathy for those people so that 
she gives them a full and fair hearing and seeks to understand the real-
world impact of her decisions on them, she will be doing nothing wrong—
nothing wrong by the measure of history, nothing wrong by the measure 
of justice.72  
 
Beyond this, other Sotomayor defenders emphasized a legal tradition of judicial 
rulings and past legislation that aimed to rectify structural disadvantages faced by 
certain constituencies—and voiced their hope that Sotomayor would fall within this 
tradition.73 Finally, others emphasized the benefits of Sotomayor herself adding to 
the diversity of the Supreme Court’s personnel, with attendant benefits for both the 
popular legitimacy of the institution and for the future development of the law itself. 
For example, as Senator Durbin (D-IL) noted, someone with Sotomayor’s distinctive 
life experiences should affect how a nine-person institutional body might grapple 
with difficult legal issues: 
 
Does anybody believe there is a clear, objective answer to every case that 
comes before the Supreme Court? If they do, please explain to me why 
one-third of all rulings in that Court in the last term were decided by a 5-
to-4 vote. Does anybody believe that women judges have not helped their 
male colleagues understand the realities of sex discrimination and sexual 
harassment in the workplace? Study after study has shown that men and 
women on the bench sometimes rule differently in discrimination cases. 
That is why diversity is so important. This doesn’t mean their rulings are 
based on personal bias. It simply means that Americans see the world 
through the prism of various experiences and perspectives. Our Supreme 
                                               
71 See 155 CONG. REC. 20654 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy (D-VT)); 155 CONG. 
REC. 20661, 20662 (2009) (statement of Sen. Feinstein (D-CA)); 155 CONG. REC. 20778 
(2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 155 CONG. REC. 20846 (2009) (statement of Sen. Durbin 
(D-IL)); 155 CONG. REC. 20848 (statement of Sen. Durbin).  
72 155 CONG. REC. 20667 (2009) (statement of Sen. Whitehouse (D-RI)). 
73 See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. 20654, 20655 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy (D-VT)). 
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Court Justices should possess an equally rich and wide field of vision as 
they interpret the facts and the law.74 
 
The upshot of these various arguments was not necessarily a defense of 
partiality for its own sake. As some of these speakers emphasized, these more 
specific endorsements of partiality ultimately added up to a defense of a more 
nuanced and more substantive form of impartiality. As Senator Leahy (D-VT) noted, 
“What the partisan critics do not appreciate is that the opposite of empathy is 
indifference and a lack of understanding. Empathy does not mean biased or mean 
picking one side over another; it means understanding both sides.”75 Developing this 
theme further, Senator Leahy pressed an almost Madisonian-esque argument that 
greater inclusion of diverse perspectives would ensure a checking of biases that 
might lead to a more realistically impartial judiciary: 
 
By striving for a more diverse bench drawn from judges with a wider set 
of backgrounds and experiences we can better ensure there will be no 
prejudices and biases controlling our courts of justice. All nominees have 
talked about the value they will draw on the bench from their backgrounds. 
That diversity of experience and strength is not a weakness in achieving 
an impartial judiciary.76  
 
Not surprisingly, those more skeptical of the Sotomayor nomination 
emphasized the illegitimacy of partiality. In doing so, they had two targets. The first 
was Obama’s reference to empathy as part of his criteria in selecting a Supreme 
Court nominee. The second target was a portion of a speech given by Sotomayor 
herself in 2001 at the U.C. Berkeley Law School that specifically referenced her own 
ethnic identity as a laudable influence upon her ability to perform the judicial role. 
This was the comment in question: 
 
Justice O’Connor has often been cited as saying that a wise old man and 
wise old woman will reach the same conclusion in deciding cases. I am 
not so sure Justice O’Connor is the author of that line since Professor 
Resnik attributes that line to Supreme Court Justice Coyle. I am also not 
so sure that I agree with the statement. First, as Professor Martha Minnow 
                                               
74 155 CONG. REC. 20847 (2009) (statement of Sen. Durbin). See also 155 CONG. REC. 
20655 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy); 155 CONG. REC. 20663 (2009) (statement of Sen. 
Menendez (D-NJ)); 155 CONG. REC. 20678 (2009) (statement of Senator Brown (D-OH)); 
155 CONG. REC. 20713-14 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy (D-VT)); 155 CONG. REC. 20761 
(2009) (statement of Sen. Akaka (D-HI)); 155 CONG. REC. 20763 (2009) (statement of Sen. 
Merkley (D-OR)); 155 CONG. REC. 20774 (2009) (statement of Sen. Franken (D-MN)); 155 
CONG. REC. 20865 (2009) (statement of Sen. Kerry (D-MA)). 
75 155 CONG. REC. 20778 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy). 
76 155 CONG. REC. 20874 (2009) (statement of Sen. Leahy). See also id. at 20656 
(statement of Sen. Leahy). 
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has noted, there can never be a universal definition of wise. Second, I 
would hope that a wise Latina woman with the richness of her experiences 
would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white male who 
hasn’t lived that life.77 
 
The concerns raised by Sotomayor skeptics centered on at least three general themes 
that, not surprisingly, often intersected. One theme was the specter of illegitimate 
judicial activism. If empathy and solicitude for certain groups were accepted as a 
legitimate part of the judicial role, Sotomayor skeptics feared this would give free 
license to empathy-minded judges to proceed beyond the constraints of the law and 
find the outcomes dictated by their heart or sense of sympathy, rather than what was 
legitimately authorized in the Constitution or by federal statute. For example, then-
Senator Sessions (R-AL) stated on this point: 
 
Our legal system is built on a belief that there is a right answer to even the 
most difficult cases, and judges ought to give their absolute best effort to 
find that right answer. It is based on law and the facts and not what their 
personal views and values are. That is what we are all about. I think it is 
an important issue. And the activist, whether liberal or conservative, the 
activist judge allows those values and prejudices and political views and 
ideology to affect their rulings. It causes them to find some way to achieve 
a result that furthers an agenda they believe in. That is not justice, that is 
politics.78  
 
Second, and relatedly, critics claimed that judicial empathy would always be a 
matter of empathy toward some individual or specific group of individuals. This 
implied an additional, more pointed worry: that judges empowered to rule with 
empathy would be empowered to play favorites in the legal process, creating a 
constituency of the legally privileged. As a result, the Sotomayor/Obama perspective 
would imperil the very idea of impartiality as equal treatment through general rules 
and give rise to the possibility of the worst kinds of partiality, perhaps akin to 
nepotism or corruption. Indeed, Sotomayor herself explicitly articulated some self-
consciousness about these concerns in her Berkeley speech: 
 
Yet, because I accept the proposition that, as Judge Resnik describes it, “to 
judge is an exercise of power” and because as, another former law school 
                                               
77 Sotomayor, supra note 50, at 92. 
78 155 CONG. REC. 20677 (2009) (statement of Sen. Sessions). See also 155 CONG. REC. 
20736 (2009) (statement of Sen. Roberts (R-KS)); 155 CONG. REC. 20739 (2009) (statement 
of Sen. Crapo (R-ID)); 155 CONG. REC. 20755 (2009) (statement of Sen. Brownback (R-
KS)); 155 CONG. REC. 20873 (2009) (statement of Sen. Sessions); Confirmation Hearing on 
the Nomination of Hon. Sonia Sotomayor to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States, 111th Cong. 39 (2009) [hereinafter Sotomayor Confirmation Hearing] 
(statement of Sen. Tom Coburn, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (R-OK)). 
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classmate, Professor Martha Minnow of Harvard Law School, states 
“there is no objective stance but only a series of perspectives-no neutrality, 
no escape from choice in judging,” I further accept that our experiences as 
women and people of color affect our decisions. The aspiration to 
impartiality is just that—it’s an aspiration because it denies the fact that 
we are by our experiences making different choices than others.79  
 
As Senator McConnell (R-KY) stated in a comment that combined the favoritism 
concern with the judicial activism concern: 
 
[W]hen it comes to judging—empathy is only good if you are lucky 
enough to be the person or group for whom the judge in question has 
empathy. In those cases, it is the judge, not the law, which determines the 
outcome. That is a dangerous road to go down if you believe, as I do, in a 
nation not of men but of laws.80  
 
Likewise, in the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee, Senator Coburn 
(R-OK) stated the following: 
 
The American people expect their judges to treat all litigants equally, not 
to favor and not to enter the courtroom already prejudiced against one of 
the parties. That is why Lady Justice is always depicted blind and why 
Aristotle defined law as “reason free from passion.” Do we expect a judge 
to merely call balls and strikes? Maybe so, maybe not. But we certainly do 
not expect them to sympathize with one party over the other, and that is 
where empathy comes from.81  
 
Third, and finally, it is not hard to detect a point of concern raised about Sotomayor’s 
reference to a “wise Latina” that, if not always explicit, seemed to be ever-present: 
at least some Sotomayor skeptics seemed to feel a degree of insult or annoyance 
about her remarks implying a kind of personal superiority of judgment or 
perspective. Not surprisingly, this would be a potent point of criticism when a life-
                                               
79 Sotomayor, supra note 50, at 91. 
80 155 CONG. REC. 20633 (statement of Sen. McConnell). See also 155 CONG. REC. 
20657, 20658 (statement of Sen. Sessions (R-AL)); 155 CONG. REC. 20670, 20671 (statement 
of Sen. Hatch (R-UT)); 155 CONG. REC. 20677 (2009) (statement of Sen. Sessions); 155 
CONG. REC. 20706 (2009) (statement of Sen. Grassley (R-IA)); 155 CONG. REC. 20739-40 
(2009) (statement of Sen. Wicker (R-MS)); 155 CONG. REC. 20744 (statement of Sen. Kyl 
(R-AZ)); 155 CONG. REC. 20749 (2009) (statement of Sen. Coburn (R-OK)); 155 CONG. REC. 
20854 (2009) (statement of Sen. Grassley); 155 CONG. REC. 20870 (2009) (statement of Sen. 
Johanns (R-NE)); 155 CONG. REC. 20873 (2009) (statement of Sen. Sessions). 
81 Sotomayor Confirmation Hearing, supra note 78 (statement of Sen. Tom Coburn, 
Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary (R-OK)). 
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tenured position on the U.S. Supreme Court was on the line. For example, this was 
Senator Grassley’s comment on the “wise Latina woman” phrase: 
 
Since 1994, the judge has given a number of speeches where she 
responded to a remark by Justice O’Connor that a judge’s gender should 
be irrelevant to [the] judicial decision-making process. Judge Sotomayor 
said that she “hope[d] that a wise Latina woman . . . would more often than 
not reach a better conclusion than a white male who hasn’t lived that life.” 
 
This statement suggests, very contrary to the Constitution, that race and 
gender influence judicial decisions and that some judges can reach a 
“better conclusion” solely on the basis of belonging to a particular 
demographic.82 
 
Before elaborating on some of the deeper threads of commonality across the 
various perspectives on impartiality and partiality articulated in these two 
nomination efforts, I should preliminarily note a point of convergence between 
Roberts and Sotomayor. Compare these two comments—one is a passage from 
Sotomayor’s Berkeley speech, and the other is a comment by Roberts during his 
hearings in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee: 
 
Each day on the bench I learn something new about the judicial process 
and about being a professional Latina woman in a world that sometimes 
looks at me with suspicion. I am reminded each day that I render decisions 
that affect people concretely and that I owe them constant and complete 
vigilance in checking my assumptions, presumptions and perspectives and 
ensuring that to the extent that my limited abilities and capabilities permit 
me, that I reevaluate them and change as circumstances and cases before 
me requires. I can and do aspire to be greater than the sum total of my 
experiences but I accept my limitations. I willingly accept that we who 
judge must not deny the differences resulting from experience and heritage 
but attempt, as the Supreme Court suggests, continuously to judge when 
those opinions, sympathies and prejudices are appropriate.83 
 
[O]f course, we [judges] all bring our life experiences to the bench. But I 
will say this: that the ideal in the American justice system is epitomized 
by the fact that judges, Justices, do wear the black robes, and that is meant 
                                               
82 155 CONG. REC. 20706 (2009) (statement of Sen. Grassley (R-IA)). See also 155 
CONG. REC. 20745 (statement of Sen. Kyl (R-AZ)); Sotomayor Confirmation Hearing, supra 
note 78, at 27 (statement of Sen. Lindsey Graham, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 
(R-SC)); Id. at 39 (statement of Sen. Tom Coburn, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary 
(R-OK)). 
83 Sotomayor, supra note 50, at 93. 
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to symbolize the fact that they’re not individuals promoting their own 
particular views, but they are supposed to be doing their best to interpret 
the law, to interpret the Constitution, according to the rule of law, not their 
own preferences, not their own personal beliefs. That’s the ideal.84  
 
At the level of aspiration, one might say there is a great deal of convergence between 
the Sotomayor and Roberts perspectives on the judicial role. Their divergence seems 
more a matter of their respective optimism about judges being able to put aside their 
biases and to see beyond their own life experiences. Sotomayor was criticized for an 
undertone of superiority in her wise Latina comment.85 However, it is ironic that she 
attracted this criticism relative to Roberts because her comments in that speech also 
demonstrated significantly greater humility about the exercise of judicial power and 
the potential pitfalls of sitting in judgment of others who have vastly different life 
experiences.86 Ultimately these issues regarding the relative differences between 
Sotomayor and Roberts in recognizing and articulating the limits of a judge’s 
perspective, and how to respond to this shortfall accordingly, marks the primary 
point of divergence between them—at least as suggested by the above quotations. 
With that point made, let me return below to drawing out in greater detail the points 
of convergence between these two justices, and their respective supporters. 
 
C.  Points of Commonality 
 
The first area of notable convergence among all speakers in these confirmation 
efforts is the outwardly-expressed belief that legal and judicial legitimacy requires a 
kind of fairness implicating both legal process and legal outcomes. Namely, I would 
assert that a common thread across most of these speakers is an outwardly-expressed 
belief that legitimate judicial process—and the legitimate exercise of judicial 
power—requires that a “fair chance” within the legal system be given for those 
individuals similar to the speaker, or similar to constituencies that the speaker cares 
about. Of course, what individuals think a “fair chance” entails for such individuals 
is hardly a point of consensus in these debates, but I would maintain that this idea in 
a more abstract sense encompasses both a procedural and substantive normative 
ideal for speakers on both sides of these two confirmation efforts. 
By way of beginning to unpack this point, consider the Republican side first—
those who were more oriented toward a pro-Roberts and anti-Sotomayor position in 
                                               
84 Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing, supra note 48, at 205 (statement of John G. 
Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States). 
85 I might add that the context of her comment suggested that Justice Sotomayor was 
also emphasizing the relatively greater value of the experience of a racial minority woman 
on issues specifically impacting racial minorities and women. Sotomayor, supra note 50, at 
92. 
86 The parallels between her Berkeley comments and the above-noted Roberts 
comment, along with the irony mentioned here, did not escape her supporters during the 
confirmation debates either. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. 20778 (2009) (statement of Sen. 
Leahy). 
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these debates. For these individuals, the procedural component of fairness was the 
centerpiece of many of their arguments: there were many speakers who emphasized 
that the essence of judicial fairness lay in the equal treatment of all according to 
general rules.  
However, few Republican Senators would have taken such statements at face 
value and assumed that such defenses of impartiality were wholly divorced from 
substantive legal outcomes. Indeed, in the debates themselves, some of these 
speakers felt little hesitation in pairing this emphasis on generality and neutral 
procedures with emphatic defenses of specific substantive goals. Thus, for most 
Republican Senators, gun owners should fare better, in front of an impartial judge, 
than those who would propose greater gun restrictions. In such situations, the mark 
of judicial impartiality stemmed less from fidelity to any purportedly neutral 
process, and more from fidelity to specific outcomes. For example, this was the 
comment by Senator Coburn: “I remain concerned that Judge Sotomayor’s hostility 
to gun rights, abortion restrictions, and property rights, among others, stem from a 
‘personal prejudice’ that will influence her decisions once she is untethered from 
precedent.”87 Of course, this type of special solicitude for social groups aligned with 
the Republican Party would not qualify, under the Republican perspective, as 
illegitimate favoritism because the basis for the seemingly favorable treatment of 
these groups by like-minded judges would lie in the fact that these outcomes were 
dictated—at least in theory—by the impartial administration of clearly defined, and 
legitimately created constitutional rights.88 
The substantive component of fairness, as endorsed by the Republican side in 
these debates, is even more clearly illustrated in the critiques and attention they 
placed on Sotomayor’s “wise Latina” remarks. As noted above, Republican critiques 
about these remarks as antithetical to judicial impartiality were quite common, but 
some went further to emphasize their annoyance with the hint of superiority implied 
in Sotomayor’s assertion that someone with her background might reach a “better” 
legal conclusion than a white male judge.89 From these starting points, it is not hard 
to connect such critiques to the types of concerns voiced by Senator Coburn above 
that focused on legal outcomes. Put more bluntly than what we saw in the debates, 
and in a way that links both the procedural and substantive, one might readily 
speculate that a Sotomayor critic worried that a judge like Sotomayor, with her 
                                               
87 155 CONG. REC. 20750 (2009) (statement of Sen. Coburn).  
88 Many examples might be mentioned to support this point, but here I simply cite some 
additional instances of Republican Senators voicing a substantive concern about the future 
protection of gun rights with Sotomayor’s confirmation. See, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. 20659 
(2009) (statement of Sen. Sessions (R-AL)); 155 CONG. REC. 20740 (2009) (statement of 
Sen. Wicker (R-MS)); 155 CONG. REC. 20747 (2009) (statement of Sen. Kyl (R-AZ)); 155 
CONG. REC. 20871 (2009) (statement of Sen. Hutchison (R-TX)). On the Republican Party 
commitment to gun rights, as reflected in Republican Party platforms from 1992–2016, see 
Stuart Chinn, Political Parties and Constitutional Fidelity, 102 MARQUETTE L. REV. 387, 
427–28 (2018) [hereinafter Chinn, Political Parties]. 
89 See supra Section II.B. at notes 77–82. 
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distinctive way of looking at the world—born out of her ethnic identity and her 
background—would be unlikely to look at the world in a way that would result in 
just or fair outcomes to those with different ethnic identities or backgrounds.  
For Sotomayor supporters/Roberts critics, the intertwinement of procedural and 
substantive considerations in their larger notions of fairness and judicial legitimacy 
can also be gleaned in these Senate debates. The substantive elements were, for 
many, the central arguments in their skepticism about the Roberts’s nomination and 
their endorsement of the Sotomayor nomination. Whether tied to societal 
discrimination, unequal resources, or structural biases within the law itself, 
achieving impartiality or fairness—under this view—requires judicial actors to 
exhibit empathy or special solicitude for certain groups to reach a more substantive 
equality.90 However, equally worthy of attention were the procedural elements 
within the Democratic view as well. On this, it bears emphasizing that Sotomayor 
had little appetite for expanding upon her anxieties about judicial impartiality during 
her confirmation hearings91 or elaborating on the role of empathy in judging.92 Her 
statement in response to a question from Senator Schumer during her confirmation 
hearings illustrates this point: 
 
Senator SCHUMER. But let us start with the basics. Will you commit to 
us today that you will give every litigant before the court a fair shake and 
that you will not let your personal sympathies toward any litigant over-
rule what the law requires?  
 
Judge SOTOMAYOR. That commitment I can make and have made for 
17 years.93  
 
Notwithstanding some of the larger points she raised in her Berkeley speech, judicial 
legitimacy—even for Democrats like Senator Schumer—had to rest in part on 
broader procedural norms that constrain and limit the degree of judicial solicitude 
that might be extended to certain social groups under the law. 
What emerges then is a view about impartiality and fairness that is quite similar 
across both parties, even if there might be more candor about this view from the 
Democratic side. Fairness necessarily entails a set of impersonal procedures one step 
removed from pressing controversies—in line with Wechsler’s famous definition of 
neutral principles94—but the plausibility or attractiveness of those procedures is 
measured against the substantive outcomes they generate. We might go even one 
                                               
90 See supra Section II.A. at notes 59–65. 
91 Sotomayor Confirmation Hearing, supra note 78, at 59 (statement of Sonia 
Sotomayor., Nominee to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States). 
92 Id. at 121 (“We apply law to facts. We don’t apply feelings to facts.”). 
93 Sotomayor Confirmation Hearing, supra note 78, at 127 (statement of Charles 
Schumer, Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary and Sonia Sotomayor., Nominee to be 
an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States (D-NY)). 
94 Wechsler, supra note 31. 
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step further in highlighting convergence on the substantive requirements that would 
amount to, or legitimate, procedures: even here, I think senators from both parties 
converge on the abstract ideal that certain social groups be assured of receiving a 
fair chance or a fair shake in front of an impartial judge. The specific groups entitled 
to this solicitude, and the precise content of a “fair chance,” are clearly items where 
no likely consensus among Senators would occur. But one might presume a common 
aspiration that judges be able to look beyond themselves to see life through the eyes 
of those unlike them. Nothing about this perspective would sound foreign or 
misaligned with most Democratic arguments.95 I believe this perspective underlies 
much of the concern about the Sotomayor nomination on the Republican side as 
well.96 
A second point of convergence lies in the apparent agreement of all that debates 
about legal and judicial legitimacy should be about something different than pure 
partisanship. To be sure, charges of base partisanship certainly appear in these 
debates. Neither party was shy about claiming that the other party had members 
motivated by less than noble purposes for the positions that they took in these 
nominations.97 But in the very act of making these charges, and as apparent 
throughout the discussion in the preceding Part, speakers of all stripes acknowledged 
that legal legitimacy must rest on constraints that may be absent from a more general 
political debate. This is an unsurprising position for an individual, like Roberts, who 
claimed that the core value of judges lay in being impartial98—the very antithesis of 
partisanship. Indeed, as Roberts himself insisted in his opening statement, “I have 
no platform. Judges are not politicians who can promise to do certain things in 
exchange for votes.”99 Equally significant, however, is that for those individuals who 
                                               
95 See supra notes 57–64, 71–76 and accompanying text. 
96 See supra notes 79–81 and accompanying text. 
97 For example, from the Roberts confirmation debates, see, e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 
21409 (2005) (statement of Sen. Specter (R-PA)) (“I suggest it is in the national interest that 
there be a lowering of the decibel level of the partisan rhetoric. There is no doubt that the 
process for the nomination, hearings, and confirmation of a Supreme Court nominee is part 
of the political process. I further suggest partisanship has its limits. The core objection raised 
by certain Democratic political activists as outlined in the Washington Post story is 
frustration among party activists who think their elected leaders did not put up a serious fight 
against Judge Roberts.”); 155 CONG. REC. 21033 (2005) (statement of Sen. Obama (D-IL)) 
(“These groups on the right and left should not resort to the sort of broad-brush dogmatic 
attacks that have hampered the process in the past and constrained each and every Senator in 
this Chamber from making sure that they are voting on the basis of their conscience.”). In 
addition, from the Sotomayor confirmation debates, see, e.g., 155 CONG. REC. 20732 (2009) 
(statement of Sen. Lautenberg (D-NJ)) (“Yet, in one of the most scurrilous campaigns against 
a judicial nominee I have ever witnessed, the partisan attack mills begin to churn out piles of 
distortions and half-truths about Judge Sotomayor right after the President picked her to be 
his nominee. They had their gunsights settled on whoever it might be.”). 
98 See supra notes 51–53 and accompanying text. 
99 Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing, supra note 48, at 56 (statement of John G. Roberts, 
Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States). 
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would endorse the legitimacy of some partiality in the law, this constraint was also 
very real.100  
Third and finally, it is possible to detect a middle ground in these debates about 
the nature of the law itself. On the one hand, the indeterminacy of the law in some 
respects is hard to deny. The prevalence of 5-4 votes in many high-profile areas of 
constitutional law101 provides skepticism about a more formalist view of the law 
where objectively right answers exist, waiting to be discovered by judges who 
simply work hard enough.102 However, no one—not even Sotomayor—had the 
appetite to go totally in the other direction and claim that the law was wholly 
indeterminate and subject to political whim or contingency. To go in this direction 
would be to entertain the fear of partisanship discussed above, but even more 
fundamentally, undermine the aspiration of the rule of law as a stabilizing force 
worthy of our respect, and capable of binding a diverse polity together.103 So what 
we are left with is a view of the law as somewhere in between—partly indeterminate, 
but determinate enough to be different from mere political will. 
 
III.  PARTY IDEOLOGIES AND JUDICIAL MODESTY 
 
As evident in the preceding discussion of the Roberts and Sotomayor hearings, 
themes of generality and partiality recurred in Senate discussions about the judicial 
role. Both ideals informed competing perspectives on judicial impartiality, 
specifically with respect to how judges might fairly or impartially apply the law to 
discrete parties. And while it is unlikely that any of the speakers quoted in the 
preceding Part would have subscribed to an ideal of generality or partiality in 
totality, the former aligned more frequently with Republican Senators (and Chief 
Justice Roberts), while the latter more frequently aligned with Democratic Senators 
(and Justice Sotomayor).104 
From that initial observation, this Part addresses two related questions. First, 
what might account for this divergence between Democrats and Republicans on the 
                                               
100 See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
101 See infra Part IV. 
102 This is, of course, hardly a new insight in the legal scholarly literature. See generally 
Joseph William Singer, The Player and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 
1 (1984). In discussing some of the core ideas of the Critical Legal Studies movement, Singer 
notes that “legal reasoning is indeterminate and contradictory.” Id. at 5–6. Singer goes on to 
say that the real purpose of legal theory is to “‘edify,’ that is, it should ‘help . . . readers, or 
society as a whole, break free from outworn vocabularies and attitudes, rather than . . . 
provide ‘grounding’ for the institutions and customs of the present.’” Id. at 8 (citing RICHARD 
RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE xiii (1st ed. 1979)). See also Tushnet, 
supra note, 45, at 824–27 (expressing skepticism about the attractiveness and workability of 
various constitutional theories as a legitimate guide for judicial actions). 
103 Sotomayor Confirmation Hearing, supra note 78 (statement of Sen. Tom Coburn, 
Member, Senate Comm. on the Judiciary) (singling out the rule of law as “the glue that binds 
us [the United States] together”). 
104 See supra Part II. 
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nature of judicial impartiality? That is, what elements within the Democratic and 
Republican parties might predispose each to a distinctive view of the judicial role? 
Second, even if we see this partisan divergence in the Senate debates, it nevertheless 
leaves unanswered the distinct question concerning how such ideals are actually 
applied in adjudication. Do these notions of generality and partiality, as articulated 
in the Senate debates, appear as such in the constitutional rulings written by the 
Court? 
In this Part, I will offer some tentative answers to these questions. In doing so, 
I will ultimately flesh out, in a preliminary fashion, a descriptive argument about 
certain Supreme Court behaviors in the contemporary context. In brief, Sections A 
and B below will locate the Democratic affinity for partiality and the Republican 
affinity for generality within both the coalitional structure and the ideological 
orientation of each party. However, as I will discuss in Section C, we should not 
necessarily expect these elements of party ideology to be perfectly transposed into 
judicial opinions. Rather, notwithstanding their points of ideological divergence, 
more liberal and more conservative Supreme Court justices occupy a shared 
institutional environment by virtue of their shared membership on the Court. As 
such, justices of different ideological persuasions must navigate a common political 
and institutional context that, at least since the beginning of the Roberts Court, has 
been marked by persistent judicial uncertainty. Thus, only after judicial notions of 
partiality or generality are altered through this shared context of judicial-institutional 
caution can we finally get a glimpse of how these divergent notions of judicial 
impartiality are actually applied in contemporary adjudication.105 
 
A.  Party Logics: Democrats 
 
My first claim is that the divergence between the two parties on judicial 
impartiality is strongly linked to the coalitional and ideological characteristics of 
each party. For the Democrats, their affinity for partiality perhaps lies within the 
very DNA of the party. At root, an endorsement of partiality entails a belief that 
American society possesses distinct constituencies and social classes, and that some 
of these constituencies and social classes are subject to particular hardships and 
challenges that are worthy of being recognized by governmental actors.106 The 
origins of this belief within the Democratic Party go back to the Jacksonian 
                                               
105 My focus then is in explaining certain types of judicial behavior as a product of party 
ideology intersecting with judicial-institutional considerations. This argument is related, 
though distinct, from others who focus on the connection between the elected branches and 
the Court by seeking to explain why elected officials may, at times, wish to support more 
expansive forms of judicial authority. See, e.g., STEPHEN M. ENGEL, AMERICAN POLITICIANS 
CONFRONT THE COURT: OPPOSITION POLITICS AND CHANGING RESPONSES TO JUDICIAL 
POWER 67–68 (2011); KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF JUDICIAL 
SUPREMACY: THE PRESIDENCY, THE SUPREME COURT, AND CONSTITUTIONAL LEADERSHIP 
IN U.S. HISTORY 22–25, 283–84 (2007). 
106 See infra notes 107–15 and accompanying text. 
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Democrats, who emphasized the social welfare and worthiness of laborers and 
agrarians, as opposed to the more repugnant and corrupt investor and financial 
classes.107 This is what Jackson himself stated in the most memorable passage of his 
veto of the Second Bank of the United States: 
 
It is to be regretted that the rich and powerful too often bend the acts of 
government to their selfish purposes. Distinctions in society will always 
exist under every just government. Equality of talents, of education, or of 
wealth can not be produced by human institutions. In the full enjoyment 
of the gifts of Heaven and the fruits of superior industry, economy, and 
virtue, every man is equally entitled to protection by law; but when the 
laws undertake to add to these natural and just advantages artificial 
distinctions, to grant titles, gratuities, and exclusive privileges, to make the 
rich richer and the potent more powerful, the humble members of 
society—the farmers, mechanics, and laborers—who have neither the time 
nor the means of securing like favors to themselves, have a right to 
complain of the injustice of their Government. There are no necessary 
evils in government. Its evils exist only in its abuses. If it would confine 
itself to equal protection, and, as Heaven does its rains, shower its favors 
alike on the high and the low, the rich and the poor, it would be an 
unqualified blessing. In the act before me there seems to be a wide and 
unnecessary departure from these just principles.108 
 
The Jacksonians incorporated this segmented view of American society into a 
larger view of federal governmental laissez-faire. For them, federal governmental 
action was to be discouraged since any such actions were perceived to more likely 
favor the investor and financial classes. In contrast, a posture of federal 
governmental laissez-faire would work to the advantage of the laboring and agrarian 
class.109 Still, a segmented view of American society and a corollary belief in the 
special solicitude due to certain classes—what we might call a “class political” 
perspective110—does not logically require a belief in governmental laissez-faire. 
Indeed, toward the end of the nineteenth century, Democratic Party ideology 
would—thanks to the influence of agrarian populists—fuse a class political 
perspective with a demand for federal government intervention to alleviate the 
particular hardship of certain constituencies.111 
                                               
107 Chinn, Political Parties, supra note 88, at 399–400.  
108 Andrew Jackson, U.S. Pres., Veto Message Regarding the Bank of the United States 
(July 10, 1832), http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/ajveto01.asp [https://perma.cc/6Q 
UG-9FJG]. 
109 Chinn, Political Parties, supra note 88, at 401. 
110 Stuart Chinn, The Ideology Behind Brown v. Board of Education: Political Parties 
and “Jurisprudential Bundling,” 92 DENV. U.L. REV. 45, 52–58 (2014) [hereinafter Chinn, 
Ideology Behind Brown]. 
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Aspects of this populist view ultimately culminated in the ideology of the New 
Deal Democrats in the 1930s, with its focus on urban workers and agrarians, and its 
commitment to a federal social welfare state to alleviate the Depression Era-
hardships of these and other worthy constituencies against the predation of 
“economic royalists.”112 In many respects, this basic ideology still orients the 
modern Democratic Party. The constituent parts of the Democratic Party coalition 
have changed with the gradual disappearance of Southern Democrats from the Party 
through the course of the twentieth century (who have become Republicans) and the 
increased focus within the Party in recent years on social groups defined by status 
characteristics such as race, gender, and sexual orientation.113 Still, the class political 
perspective remains as central as ever.114 Accordingly, commentators have often 
characterized the modern Democratic Party as more a big-tent organization 
constituted by a diversity of social and interest groups and held together by a 
relatively thin ideology focused on significant policy positions.115 Unsurprisingly, 
such a party would be inclined to an ideal of partiality in the judicial application of 
the law. 
Beyond its history and its ideology, the Democratic Party’s affinity for 
partiality is also evident in some of the key jurisprudential themes articulated by 
Democratic-appointed justices and progressive-leaning legal theorists over the 
twentieth century. To highlight a few brief examples: Carolene Products’s Footnote 
Four stands out as one of the most prominent statements in constitutional doctrine 
in defense of the ideal of partiality. Chief Justice Stone—himself an FDR appointee 
to the Chief Justice position—hinted in Footnote Four’s memorable third paragraph 
that heightened judicial scrutiny could be appropriate for laws that targeted 
“religious,” “national,” or “racial” minorities, or for laws that encompassed 
“prejudice against discrete and insular minorities.”116 
A commitment to partiality was also front and center in the Warren Court’s 
assault on racial apartheid in the South in the middle of the twentieth century—
including, most prominently, Brown v. Board of Education’s prohibition of 
segregation in public schools.117 And the significance of partiality was likewise 
                                               
112 WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG, FRANKLIN ROOSEVELT AND THE NEW DEAL, 1932-
1940, at 183–184, 195 (1963); 3 ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: 
THE POLITICS OF UPHEAVAL: 1935–1936 584 (2003). 
113 See, e.g., DEMOCRATIC PARTY, 2016 DEMOCRATIC PARTY PLATFORM 16–17 (2016) 
(including guaranteeing “civil rights,” “women’s rights,” and “Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and 
Transgender rights” as part of the party’s platform). 
114 Chinn, Political Parties, supra note 88, at 416–17. 
115 See, e.g., MATT GROSSMAN & DAVID A. HOPKINS, ASYMMETRIC POLITICS: 
IDEOLOGICAL REPUBLICANS AND GROUP INTEREST DEMOCRATS 3, 299–300 (2016); 
WILLIAM G. MAYER, THE DIVIDED DEMOCRATS: IDEOLOGICAL UNITY, PARTY REFORM, AND 
PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS 8, 73–74 (1996); Jo Freeman, The Political Culture of the 
Democratic and Republican Parties, 101 POL. SCI. Q. 327, 329, 351 (1986). 
116 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n. 4 (1938). 
117 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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evident in much of the legal scholarship inspired by the Warren Court’s work, such 
as John Hart Ely’s theory of representation-reinforcement118 and Owen Fiss’s 
articulation of an anti-subordination or “group disadvantaging” principle in 
constitutional equal protection.119 
Finally, one additional point should be noted about the Democratic Party’s 
affinity for partiality in more recent years. As already indicated in the preceding 
Part, the Democratic endorsement of partiality has often been almost tentative. The 
most visible illustration of this in the prior Part was Sotomayor’s apparent need to 
distance herself from the clear implication of her “wise Latina” speech, and to 
endorse generality-friendly platitudes in her confirmation hearings.120 
Sotomayor’s hesitation in offering a full-throated defense of partiality reveals 
much about which values are dominant in public discourse. It also reveals the sense 
of caution a Supreme Court nominee might acutely feel about wading into topics 
perceived as controversial. But read more expansively, Sotomayor’s comments 
might be seen to align with the observation of others that at the present time, the 
Democratic Party—and by implication, its preferred judicial appointees—lack a 
fully-formed coherent ideology about partiality.  
Perhaps ironically, then-professor and now-Justice Elena Kagan once noted 
exactly this point in 1995, in the aftermath of the Ginsburg and Breyer confirmations 
to the Supreme Court: “Herein lies one of the mysteries of modern confirmation 
politics: given that the Republican Party has an ambitious judicial agenda and the 
Democratic Party has next to none, why is the former labeled the party of judicial 
restraint and the latter the party of judicial activism?”121  
More recently, Robert Post and Reva Siegel said this about Democratic or 
progressive constitutional narratives:  
 
Surprisingly, in recent years, it has been liberals, rather than conservatives, 
who have been unable to find ways to connect constitutional vision to 
living political values. In recent confirmation hearings, for example, 
liberals have defended the constitutional values of the Warren Court by 
invoking stare decisis and by emphasizing the importance of protecting 
constitutional law from the taint of politics . . .  
 
It is telling that liberals invoke the authority of judges and cases, while 
conservatives invoke the Constitution itself. To advance their 
constitutional vision, progressives emphasize the importance of respecting 
                                               
118 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 102 
(1980). 
119 Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 107, 
107–08 (1976). 
120 See supra notes 90–92 and accompanying text. 
121 Elena Kagan, Confirmation Messes, Old and New, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 919, 929 n.19 
(1995) (review of STEPHEN L. CARTER, THE CONFIRMATION MESS (1994)). 
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precedent and assert the professional autonomy of judges. They have been 
maneuvered into upholding the very detachment of law from politics that 
is the central premise of the jurisprudence of originalism thereby 
contradicting liberalism's own insight about the importance of a living 
constitutionalism.122  
 
This tentative embrace of partiality also demands an explanation, and I think recent 
Democratic Party politics related to the courts contains a partial answer. After the 
Warren Court era and beginning with the Burger Court, Democrats have largely 
enjoyed the benefit of having key precedents align with their party values such as 
the right to an abortion or affirmative action.123 At the same time, such issues have 
remained live legal controversies over the past several decades.  
Numbers tell some of the story. In his 1957 article, Robert Dahl stated the 
following about trends in Supreme Court appointments up to that point in history:  
 
[o]ver the whole history of the Court, on the average one new justice has 
been appointed every twenty-two months. Thus a president can expect to 
appoint about two new justices during one term of office; and if this were 
not enough to tip the balance on a normally divided Court, he is almost 
certain to succeed in two terms.124 
 
Recent history has not aligned with these averages. Presidents Clinton, W. Bush, 
and Obama were all two-term presidents, and each succeeded in making only two 
appointments to the Supreme Court—thus hardly doing much to shift the balance of 
the Court.125 However, going a little further back into history, there was a sequence 
of Republican presidents who had significantly better luck with Supreme Court 
appointments. Perhaps most conspicuously, Nixon was able to make four 
appointments to the Court in the span of about five years, thus ushering in the 
transition from the Warren to the Burger Courts.126 Ford made one more 
appointment—Justice Stevens—upon ascending to the presidency after 
                                               
122 Robert Post & Reva Siegel, Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living 
Constitution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 545, 571–72 (2006). 
123 See generally Fisher v. U. Tex., 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016) (addressing affirmative 
action); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (reaffirming the essential 
holdings in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and adopting an undue burden test for 
determining whether State regulations had the purpose or effect of placing substantial 
obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before viability). 
124 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a 
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 284 (1957). 
125 See United States Senate, Supreme Court Nominations: present-1789, 
https://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/reference/nominations/Nominations.htm [https://perma. 
cc/A8BW-JTDT] (last visited June 30, 2019). 
126 Id. 
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Watergate.127 Following Carter’s presidency, which yielded no Supreme Court 
appointments, Reagan added three new justices while also elevating Rehnquist to 
Chief Justice.128 Finally, George H.W. Bush, in the span of one term, added two new 
justices—Souter and Thomas.129 
Focusing on the party identity of the president nominating a Supreme Court 
justice has obvious limitations as a means of trying to gain a sense about the 
ideological leanings of a Court—particularly since some of the justices appointed 
by Republican presidents during these years included some notable and regular 
defenders of liberal positions such as Justices Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter.130 But 
the general point is that if one is inclined to look at the Supreme Court’s ideological 
composition from a baseline of political party affiliation, Democratic-appointed 
justices have been able to keep some constitutional issues close—in terms of vote 
counts—in the past few decades solely because of support from the three justices 
noted above, and swing-voting Republican-appointed justices such as Powell, 
O’Connor, and Kennedy.131 Given the available votes on the Court in recent decades, 
it is no surprise that the past several decades have not seen the flowering of an 
aggressive and full-throated liberal jurisprudence. The votes have simply not been 
there. And even with respect to liberal Democratic justices, such as Ginsburg or 
Breyer, present on the Supreme Court during these years, they have not been as 
strongly liberal on issues of civil rights as earlier justices such as an Earl Warren or 
a William Brennan.132 
Given this context, it is perhaps not surprising that the Democratic Party’s 
membership and leadership have either felt less compelled or less empowered to put 
forth a more empathic and principled defense of partiality (much less a more 
expansive liberal legal ideology). With little room to maneuver, and with a number 
of key precedents still on the books like Roe v. Wade133 that require nothing more 
from Democrats than successful defense, perhaps it is not so surprising that the 
Party’s approach has been one of incrementalism and caution. 
 




130 Lee Epstein et al., The U.S. Supreme Court Justices Database, WASH. U. ST. LOUIS, 
http://epstein.wustl.edu/research/justicesdata.html [https://perma.cc/TD2U-2D7P] (last 
updated Feb. 11, 2019). 
131 Ben Zimmer, Tracing the Meaning of the “Swing Vote” as Justice Kennedy Retires, 
WALL STREET JOURNAL (July 6, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/tracing-the-meaning-
of-swing-vote-as-justice-kennedy-retires-1530883844 [https://perma.cc/3RDU-D8XT] 
(identifying Justices Powell, O’Connor, and Kennedy as successive “swing voters” that 
“held sway in closely contested 5-4 decisions”). 
132 One system of scoring the ideology of Supreme Court justices on a liberal-
conservative spectrum on civil rights issues was created by Lee Epstein, Thomas G. Walker, 
Nancy Staudt, Scott Hendrickson, and Jason Roberts. See Epstein et al., supra note 130. 
133 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
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B.  Party Logics: Republicans 
 
By way of contrast, consider the Republican Party’s affinity for generality, as 
suggested by the discussion in Part II. At a basic level, Republican Party ideology 
has aligned with generality principles since the Party’s roots in the Whig Party in 
the middle of the nineteenth century. The Whigs, like the Republican Party that later 
replaced it, were centered on an ideal of a relatively more class-less society, where 
in theory all held the equal opportunity to rise (or fall) on the basis of their talent and 
hard work.134 According to this view, segmentations in American society were—if 
anything—only temporary divisions.135 The Republican Party elevated such notions 
to be its organizing principle of free labor; hence, its opposition to the aristocracy of 
Southern slaveholders and slavery itself stemmed from a view of those 
constituencies as antithetical to an ideal of a relatively class-less, mobile, and fluid 
American society.136 Such notions likewise help explain the Republican Party’s 
roots in both the working-class and the wealthier classes, since the former could, 
again in theory, aspire to be the latter within a generation.137 These notions 
subsequently informed the Republican Party’s core beliefs behind key legislation 
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and the Fourteenth Amendment, which 
enshrined, first statutorily and then constitutionally, a general principle of “equality 
before the law.”138  
Beyond its aversion to segmentation and class politics, there is an element of 
ideological fundamentalism in contemporary Republican discussions of the law as 
well, evident in the preceding Part. The fundamentalism likely has its roots, at least 
in part, in more recent political and legal history. First, if the modern Democratic 
Party is generally viewed as more pluralistic and focused on particular issues and 
groups without an overriding philosophy, Republicans have generally been 
perceived as more socially homogenous and ideologically cohesive.139 No doubt a 
crucial reason for this has been, at least in part, the prominent place of “movement 
                                               
134 See, e.g., Sean Wilnetz, Review: Whigs and Bankers, 8 REV. IN AM. HIST. at 344–
50 (1980) (reviewing a larger work describing the Whig party as a group that “remained 
certain that America was and would remain largely a classless, republican utopia”). 
135 Chinn, Political Parties, supra note 88, at 413, 442; Chinn, Ideology Behind Brown, 
supra note 110, at 53. 
136 ERIC FONER, FREE SOIL, FREE LABOR, FREE MEN: THE IDEOLOGY OF THE 
REPUBLICAN PARTY BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR 15–17, 20 (1995). 
137 Chinn, Political Parties, supra note 88, at 442; Chinn, Ideology Behind Brown, 
supra note 110, at 53. 
138 ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877 
243–47, 256–58 (1988). 
139 GROSSMAN & HOPKINS, supra note 115, at 3, 299–300; Freeman, supra note 115, at 
349–51. 
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conservatism” in the Republican Party since at least Reagan’s election in 1980.140 
The end result is a party oriented more toward well-defined markers of ideological 
commonality—one of which is the Party’s affinity for generality in the application 
of the law.141 
Further, the actions of the Warren Court and its legacy have undoubtedly 
shaped the contemporary Republican Party as much as the contemporary 
Democratic Party.142 As the party situated on the conservative end of legal and policy 
disputes surrounding the rights of groups defined by race, gender, sexual orientation, 
and economic class, it is not surprising that Republican senators and a Republican 
nominee such as John Roberts would be more skeptical of ideals that demand special 
judicial solicitude for these groups. Further, the Republican Party’s long-running 
antipathy toward the Warren Court and its remaining precedents143 likely played a 
role during the Roberts nomination in stoking this ideological zeal: indeed, the more 
emphatic ideological orientation of Republicans in promoting the ideal of generality 
might be understood as the work of the zealous reformer seeking to rally enough 
support to undo an unjust and illegitimate status quo. 
Finally, although the topic of originalism garnered more attention in subsequent 
confirmation hearings and debates, it did get some discussion in the Roberts and 
Sotomayor hearings.144 The originalist methodology, also rooted in Republican 
                                               
140 MARY C. BRENNAN, TURNING RIGHT IN THE SIXTIES: THE CONSERVATIVE CAPTURE 
OF THE GOP 1–5 (1995); HEATHER COX RICHARDSON, TO MAKE MEN FREE: A HISTORY OF 
THE REPUBLICAN PARTY 239–41, 273–74 (2014). 
141 As Richardson describes movement conservatives, “[h]elping their cause was that 
they were so convinced they were right they refused to budge on anything. As they held fast, 
they forced the rest of America to leave the middle of the political spectrum and move toward 
them.” RICHARDSON, supra note 140, at 274. 
142 See infra notes 143–48 and accompanying text. 
143 See Graber, infra note 158. 
144 Originalism received very little attention in the Sotomayor hearings. However, 
Republican Senator DeMint stated there: “That is how precedent has worked in our court 
system. Every time the Supreme Court bases a decision on a precedent rather than on the 
underlying Constitution, the original intent of the Founders is lost and becomes distorted.” 
155 CONG. REC. 20827 (2009). In the Roberts nomination, Roberts resisted applying the 
“originalist” label to himself. See Roberts’s Confirmation Hearing, supra note 48, at 158 
(statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be Chief Justice of the United States) (“Like 
most people, I resist the labels. I have told people when pressed that I prefer to be known as 
a modest judge, and to me that means . . . an appreciation that the role of the judge is limited, 
that a judge is to decide the cases before them, they’re not to legislate, they’re not to execute 
the laws.”). This point was subsequently mentioned in the debates a number of times. See, 
e.g., 151 CONG. REC. 21193 (2005) (statement of Sen. Specter); 151 CONG. REC. 21393 
(2005) (statement of Sen. Wyden); 151 CONG. REC. 21409 (2005) (statement of Sen. 
Sessions); 151 CONG. REC. 21640 (2005) (statement of Sen. Kohl). 
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dissatisfaction with the work of the Warren Court,145 exemplifies and embodies (at 
least in some forms) many of the themes encompassed within the comments 
supportive of, or voiced by, Roberts—a belief in the objectivity of the law;146 a belief 
that judicial discretion can be limited; and, related to the preceding point, a belief 
that judicial impartiality is closely tethered to judicial modesty.147 Likely because of 
the influence of movement conservatism, the Republican Party’s endorsement of 
originalism carries ideological confidence that is distinct from contemporary 
Democrats.148 As noted above, from Democratic appointees we see an approach that 
is both more cautious and more pragmatic. 
 
C.  Judicial-Institutional Logics 
 
Notwithstanding the various historical, institutional, and legal factors that have 
led Democrats to diverge from Republicans in their respective notions of judicial 
impartiality, and notwithstanding this divergence between the Democratic and 
Republican Supreme Court nominees discussed here, there is also a point of 
convergence for Supreme Court justices of both parties. Even if they may otherwise 
depart on many points, every member of the Court faces certain common broader 
judicial-institutional constraints. 
The two factors that are worthy of emphasis here speak to constraints internal 
and external to the Court. First, the current Court, like the Rehnquist Court that 
                                               
145 Morton J. Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change—Legal Fundamentality 
without Fundamentalism, 107 HARV. L. REV. 30, 65 (1993); Keith E. Whittington, The New 
Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 599, 601 (2004). 
146 Horwitz, supra note 145, at 99; Edwin Meese III, Our Constitution’s Design: The 
Implications for Its Interpretation, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 381, 382–83 (1987).  
147 Edwin Meese III, Construing the Constitution, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 22, 29 (1985); 
Whittington, supra note 145, at 602. Notably, however, in the academic literature the 
evolution of originalist thought has not surprisingly led to a number of distinct approaches 
or distinct originalisms. See Mitchell N. Bernman, Originalism Is Bunk, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1, 8–16 (2009); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism, 59 DUKE L.J. 239 
(2009). 
148 As Fishkin and Pozen note:  
 
[D]ifferences in the constitutional philosophies of liberals and conservatives 
suggest different normative orientations toward constitutional hardball. We will 
return to this issue below. Among other potentially relevant differences, stronger 
commitments on the Republican side to the theory of originalism and the idea of 
a “lost” Constitution are apt to yield considerably less deference toward the 
constitutional status quo and the set of unwritten norms that have evolved to 
facilitate moderation and cooperation in government. 
 
Joseph Fishkin & David E. Pozen, Asymmetric Constitutional Hardball, 118 COLUM. L. REV. 
915, 942 (2018). 
 
2019] MEANING OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 955 
preceded it, has been marked by a perpetual state of close division.149 Particularly in 
the area of equal protection, which speaks to the doctrinal focus in the next Part, 
sharply split votes are rather common.150 Further, given the swing-voting status of 
Justices Lewis Powell, Sandra Day O’Connor, and Anthony Kennedy in this 
doctrinal area, they have had outsized influence in the major rulings during this 
period (though the appointment of Justice Kavanaugh, of course, is likely to shift 
the Court rightward).151  
The second institutional constraint worthy of emphasis is the intensely 
competitive and polarizing nature of electoral politics outside the Court. As an 
indicator of the intensely competitive nature of current politics, divided government 
has been the dominant condition of the federal government since Richard Nixon’s 
election in 1968.152 In the 26 Congresses elected from 1968 to 2018, 19 have been 
part of divided governments, while only 7 have been part of unified governments.153 
By comparison, in the 26 Congresses elected between 1914 through 1966, the 
numbers are almost exactly reversed: 20-unified and 6-divided.154 In short, like the 
Court itself, the elected branches of the federal government have been subject to a 
persistent state of uncertainty, with neither party able to gain decisive control for 
any sustained period of time. Furthermore, this state of persistent, divided 
government has been marked by heightened political polarization and increased 
ideological homogeneity within each party.155 Especially in comparison to the 
extended influence of the New Deal Democratic coalition in the middle portion of 
the twentieth century, it is difficult to identify any analogous dominance by either 
                                               
149 See Zimmer, supra note 131 (identifying three successive generations of “swing 
voters” that have pushed the court to 5-4 decisions). 
150 See infra Part IV. 
151 See, e.g., Regents of the University of California v. Fisher II, 136 S.Ct. 2198 (2016) 
(4-3 vote, with majority opinion authored by Kennedy); Fisher v. University of Texas (Fisher 
I), 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701 (2007) (5–4 vote; majority opinion by Roberts but significant concurrence provided 
by Kennedy); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (O’Connor authoring the majority 
opinion with a 5–4 vote); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) 
(O’Connor authoring the majority opinion with a 5–4 vote); Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469 (1989) (O’Connor authoring the majority opinion; five votes came together for 
the establishment of strict scrutiny for non-federal affirmative action programs); Regents of 
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. U.S. 448, 265 (1978) (no single majority opinion, with 
Justice Powell situated as the swing vote between two voting blocs).  
152 For a visual compilation of this widely available public information, see Divided 
Government in the United States, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Divided_govern 
ment_in_the_United_States [https://perma.cc/C8X6-G877] (last visited July 1, 2019). 
153 Id. 
154 Id. 
155 ALAN I. ABRAMOWITZ, THE GREAT ALIGNMENT: RACE, PARTY TRANSFORMATION, 
AND THE RISE OF DONALD TRUMP 1–18 (2018); SEAN M. THERIAULT, PARTY POLARIZATION 
IN CONGRESS 7–8 (2008). 
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party at the federal governmental level in recent decades, where clear governing 
principles, as articulated by a dominant governing coalition, are present.156  
These two electoral dynamics—intense partisan competition and 
polarization—are plausibly related to one another. As Frances Lee notes about 
partisan competition in Congress, an intensely competitive environment heightens 
the impulses for partisan conflict.157 The realistic and tantalizing possibility for 
either party to actually capture control of Congress—and subsequently pass their 
preferred legislation—drives both parties to dig in and focus on securing electoral 
victory.158 Left by the wayside is any inclination to bipartisanship, which may bring 
about more concrete and timely legislative progress, but would do little to help either 
party advance its cause toward institutional control.159 Lee contrasts the current 
intensely competitive context with the long era of Democratic dominance of 
Congress from the New Deal through 1980. During the latter period, she suggests 
that the lessening of partisan competition in that period may have contributed to 
greater congressional productivity.160  
The long-running delicate balance of votes on the Court, combined with a 
persistent state of intensely competitive electoral politics at the federal level, create 
a common institutional context of judicial uncertainty in some high-profile areas of 
constitutional law. That is, common to both Democratic and Republican justices in 
the contemporary era is that within these doctrinal areas, judicial majorities are 
narrow and thus, unstable. Further, while key jurisprudential markers set by the 
Court may be relatively free from persistent, direct congressional or presidential 
challenge given the fluid and competitive nature of electoral politics, this same 
electoral context also provides a weak foundation for long-term jurisprudential 
developments as well: if neither more liberal or more conservative of justices have 
to worry about a reliable and persistent enemy in the elected branches, neither group 
can reliably count on the elected branches for support too. Since the chances of either 
party attaining long-term dominance akin to the New Deal Democratic coalition 
seems unlikely in the foreseeable future, this condition of uncertainty seems likely 
to persist for judicial actors; justices of both parties on the Court will not be able to 
confidently rely upon a certain set of electoral conditions to exist. 
Thus, what justices face today is a common context of uncertainty that is 
decidedly not conducive to fleshing out stable, orderly, and rational developments 
in controversial areas of the law. Where judicial majorities can be made or undone 
by the idiosyncrasies of a swing-voting justice or by the unpredictable timing of a 
justice’s retirement or death, and where there is no real tethering of the Court to a 
                                               
156 See KAREN ORREN & STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, THE POLICY STATE: AN AMERICAN 
PREDICAMENT 6–7 (2017). 
157 FRANCES E. LEE, INSECURE MAJORITIES: CONGRESS AND THE PERPETUAL 
CAMPAIGN 4–12 (2016). 
158 See Mark A. Graber, Judicial Supremacy and the Structure of Partisan Conflict, 50 
IND. L. REV. 141–44 (2016). 
159 LEE, supra note 157, at 4–12. 
160 Id. at 3–4, 198, 207–08. 
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dominant governing coalition,161 justices must reckon with an especially heightened 
degree of uncertainty and unsteadiness about the possibilities and pathways for 
future legal developments. 
This leads to a second claim: to understand how Democratic and Republican 
notions of judicial impartiality are articulated and applied in contemporary 
constitutional cases; one has to be attentive to the twin logics of the party and the 
judiciary. It is the intersection of these logics that explain this facet of judicial 
behavior. Stated in brief, for the Democrats, their already modest jurisprudential 
agenda is even further scaled down in a context of judicial uncertainty.162 
Democratic or liberal justices may defend core party values in their opinions and 
votes, along with key precedents from the liberal high-point of the Warren Court 
era.163 But for these justices, legal arguments center on technicalities and narrower 
precedent-based arguments that betray a cautious, pragmatic spirit.164  
In contrast to central rulings from the Warren Court era like Brown,165 or 
Griswold166 or even Roe167 during the Burger Court, where the rulings ultimately set 
a doctrinal agenda that would carry forward for decades, contemporary race and 
equal protection opinions are marked by a different orientation.168 Indeed, it is a 
point of irony that perhaps the most theoretically deep and abstract writing we have 
seen from the Court in recent years, in service of liberal outcomes, has been from 
Justice Kennedy––the Court’s swing vote in a series of decidedly incremental and 
modest rulings on gay rights from Romer169 through Obergefell.170 
In contrast, the context of judicial uncertainty shapes the behavior of 
Republican justices differently. Given their orientation toward generality—and 
given their more ambitious ideological agenda—this context prompts a scaling down 
of principle to slightly different effect than what appears with the Democratic 
justices. For Republican justices, assertions of broad principle with potentially 
expansive reach are not uncommon in the contemporary context.171 However, such 
statements or assertions—at least the ones that reside in majority opinions—rarely 
challenge core doctrinal structures or threaten to undo core doctrinal principles 
developed in preceding decades.172 The opinions of Republican justices then are, 
unlike those of Democratic justices, more emphatic and ambitious in their 
                                               
161 See Graber, supra note 158, at 171–74. 
162 See supra notes 158–60 and accompanying text. 
163 Id. 
164 Id. 
165 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
166 Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
167 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
168 See infra Part IV. 
169 Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
170 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (2015). 
171 See infra Part IV (examining how the opinions of Republican justices differ from 
those of Democratic justices). 
172 See Id. 
 
958 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 5 
deployment of constitutional principle.173 However, similar to the opinions of 
Democratic justices, the effects or consequences of these opinions by Republican 
justices are contained and limited in their potential scope (even if they still carry 
quite significant consequences for the controversies and litigants in question).174 If 
the progressive or liberal critique of the Court’s liberal justices is that they lack 
vision or ambition, the complaint that conservatives might state about the Court’s 
Republican justices is somewhat different: that even if they possess ideological 
ambition, they fail to live up to it.175   
 
IV.  AN EXAMINATION OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY IN THE ROBERTS COURT’S 
OPINIONS ON RACE AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
 
With the preceding points in mind, let me now offer some tentative illustration 
of them by discussing perhaps the four most significant rulings so far on race and 
equal protection by the Roberts Court: its decision on voluntary school integration 
plans in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1,176 
its most recent statements on higher education affirmative action admissions in 
Fisher v. Texas I177 and Fisher v. Texas II,178 and its upholding of a Michigan state 
constitutional amendment banning affirmative action in a wide range of state 
governmental actions in Schuette v. BAMN.179 
  
                                               
173 See Id. 
174 In 2003, Mark Tushnet described the then-Rehnquist Court’s jurisprudence as 
reflecting a “chasten[ing] of constitutional aspirations.” MARK TUSHNET, THE NEW 
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 34–35, 69 (2003). This idea still has at least some relevance, I 
would argue, for the present day. Relatedly, in reviewing Cass Sunstein’s normative defense 
of “judicial minimalism,” Jeffrey Rosen said the following about the Rehnquist Court in 
1999: “No other scholar has captured the temper of the current majority as neatly as Sunstein, 
nor has anyone else attempted to provide theoretical justification for what other observers 
took to be ad-hockery or improvisation.” Jeffrey Rosen, The Age of Mixed Results, THE NEW 
REPUBLIC (June 27, 1999), https://newrepublic.com/article/74083/the-age-mixed-results 
[https://perma.cc/96X6-WLCQ] (reviewing CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: 
JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME COURT (1999)). 
175 A notable example of this, though outside my focus on race and equal protection, 
has been the intense disappointment voiced by conservatives over the role of Justice Roberts 
in upholding the legality of Obamacare. Josh Gerstein, Conservatives Steamed at Chief 
Justice Roberts’ Betrayal, POLITICO (June 25, 2015), https://www.politico.com/story/2015/ 
06/gop-conservatives-angry-supreme-court-chief-john-roberts-obamacare-119431 [https:// 
perma.cc/79UJ-XE7Y]. 
176 551 U.S. 701 (2007). 
177 133 S. Ct. 2411 (2013). 
178 136 S. Ct. 2198 (2016). 
179 134 S. Ct. 1623 (2014). 
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A.  Judicial Arguments in Support of Generality 
 
Roberts’s opinion for the Court in Parents Involved stayed close to Republican 
Party orthodoxy in endorsing a principle of color-blindness while striking down the 
race-conscious student assignment plans at issue there.180 This principle of color-
blindness (or the anti-classification principle) views both invidious and benign racial 
classifications in the law as deeply problematic.181 As such, the anti-classification 
principle demands that governmental actors, including judicial actors, provide equal 
treatment to individuals of different races—thereby speaking to a principle of 
generality. 
Thus, in rejecting racial balancing in school composition as a compelling or 
even legitimate governmental purpose,182 Roberts stated: 
 
Accepting racial balancing as a compelling state interest would justify the 
imposition of racial proportionality throughout American society, contrary 
to our repeated recognition that “[a]t the heart of the Constitution’s 
guarantee of equal protection lies the simple command that the 
Government must treat citizens as individuals, not as simply components 
of a racial, religious, sexual or national class.” Allowing racial balancing 
as a compelling end in itself would “effectively assur[e] that race will 
always be relevant in American life, and that the ‘ultimate goal’ of 
‘eliminating entirely from governmental decisionmaking such irrelevant 
factors as a human being’s race’ will never be achieved.”183 
 
And then, in referencing Brown v. Board of Education itself, Roberts offered perhaps 
the most memorable lines of the Parents Involved opinion: 
 
Before Brown, schoolchildren were told where they could and could not 
go to school based on the color of their skin. The school districts in these 
cases have not carried the heavy burden of demonstrating that we should 
allow this once again—even for very different reasons. For schools that 
never segregated on the basis of race, such as Seattle, or that have removed 
the vestiges of past segregation, such as Jefferson County, the way “to 
achieve a system of determining admission to the public schools on a 
nonracial basis,” is to stop assigning students on a racial basis. The way to 
stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the 
basis of race.184 
 
                                               
180 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 745–46, 730 n. 17. 
181 CHINN, supra note 37, at 153–54. 
182 Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 730, 732. 
183 Id. at 730 (internal citations omitted). 
184 Id. at 747–48. 
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The same point was made even more emphatically in Justice Thomas’s concurrence 
in that case. Thomas acknowledged that race-conscious remedies could be 
appropriate in the narrow circumstances of remedying discrete, formalized acts of 
past racial discrimination.185 Beyond this narrow context, Thomas aligned with 
generality principles in demanding that governmental actors generally refrain from 
engaging in race-conscious actions.186 Indeed, Thomas’s categorical endorsement of 
a “colorblind Constitution”—and by implication, colorblind judicial impartiality—
led him to an extended commentary on the equivalence of race-conscious benign 
governmental action and Jim Crow segregation.187 
Similar reflections of Republican Party orthodoxy were aired in Thomas’s 
concurrence in Fisher I, where he discussed the University of Texas’s affirmative 
action admissions program and also repeated the comparison to Jim Crow 
segregation.188 Taking the logic of the generality principle to its logical 
jurisprudential conclusion, Thomas, writing only for himself, further stated his 
general skepticism of diversity-based justifications for affirmative action.189 He 
stated that he would overrule the Court’s prior acceptance of race-conscious 
admissions in higher education in Grutter v. Bollinger.190 In a similar vein, though 
he did not go so far as to equate affirmative action to Jim Crow segregation, Alito’s 
opinion for himself, Roberts, and Thomas in Fisher II emphatically endorsed 
principles of color-blindness and generality.191  
Finally, in Schuette v. BAMN, central in that case were the “political-process” 
precedents of Reitman v. Mulkey,192 Hunter v. Erikson,193 and Washington v. Seattle 
School District No. 1194 which potentially supported the judiciary providing special 
solicitude for racial minorities facing certain adverse governmental actions. In 
endorsing a principle of generality, Justice Scalia—also writing for Thomas—
argued for overruling Hunter and Seattle.195 Scalia further stated the following, in 
line with the preceding points: 
 
In the years since Seattle, we have repeatedly rejected “a reading of the 
guarantee of equal protection under which the level of scrutiny varies 
                                               
185 Id. at 756–57, 760 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
186 See id. at 759. 
187 Id. at 772–82. 
188 Fisher v. U. of Tex. (Fisher I), 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2427–30 (2013) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). These comments expanded upon an idea that Thomas pressed more briefly in 
his dissent in Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 365–66 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
189 Fisher I, 133 S.Ct. at 2423–28. 
190 Id. at 2421–223 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (discussing Grutter v. Bollinger, 
539 U.S. 306 (2003)). 
191 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2220–22 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
192 387 U.S. 369, 380–381 (1967). 
193 393 U.S. 385, 392–393 (1969). 
194 458 U.S. 457, 484–487 (1982). 
195 Schuette v. BAMN, 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1640–47 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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according to the ability of different groups to defend their interests in the 
representative process.” Meant to obliterate rather than endorse the 
practice of racial classifications, the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantees 
“obtai[n] with equal force regardless of ‘the race of those burdened or 
benefitted.’” The Equal Protection Clause “cannot mean one thing when 
applied to one individual and something else when applied to a person of 
another color. If both are not accorded the same protection it is not 
equal.”196 
 
Still, one would be mistaken if they concluded that the most consequential 
rulings in these cases were mostly constituted by the arguments found in Thomas’s 
concurrences in Fisher I and Parents Involved. In Roberts’s opinion for the Court in 
Parents Involved, his first extended argument centered on subjecting the enrollment 
plans in question to the Court’s well-established strict scrutiny analysis.197 This 
underscores the point that on the whole, the endorsement of generality principles by 
these conservative-leaning justices has been moderated by a felt need—against a 
background of judicial uncertainty—to anchor these arguments in established 
precedents and doctrinal technicality. In this vein, Roberts was clear in his Parents 
Involved opinion in conceding the constitutionality of Grutter and the latter’s 
endorsement of race-conscious admissions decisions in higher education.198 
Similarly, in Alito’s dissent in Fisher II (writing also for Roberts and Thomas), his 
endorsement of generality was based on a largely technical doctrinal critique of the 
University of Texas affirmative action plan, and how it failed the narrow tailoring 
requirement of strict scrutiny.199 And even in reaching this conclusion, Alito 
conceded an exception to a principle of strict color-blindness in allowing that 
governmental actors might pursue benign race-conscious measures if done so 
without the use of explicit racial classifications.200   
Likewise, in Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Schuette (in which Roberts 
and Alito joined his opinion), his upholding of the Michigan state constitutional 
amendment at issue there was considerably more cautious than Scalia’s concurring 
opinion. Kennedy began by stating that there was no question in the present case 
about the constitutionality of voluntarily adopted race-conscious affirmative action 
in higher education, an issue that had already been settled in Grutter.201 The Court’s 
focus was strictly on the Michigan state constitutional amendment prohibiting state 
and other governmental entities from employing race-based preferences, and thus its 
analysis centered on the political-process precedents in ultimately upholding the 
amendment, and in endorsing generality principles.202 
                                               
196 Id. at 1644 (citations omitted). 
197 Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 720–35 
(2007). 
198 Id. at 724–25. 
199 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2226–28, 2236–38, 2242–43 (2016) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
200 Id. at 2242. 
201 Schuette, 134 S.Ct. 1623, 1630 (2014).  
202 Id. at 1628–29; 1631–1636. 
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Perhaps the best illustration of how Republican Party principles have been 
moderated within these cases was Justice Kennedy’s concurrence in Parents 
Involved, where given his partial joining of Roberts’s opinion and given the sharp 
split in votes between the other eight justices, portions of Kennedy’s opinion could 
be read as the effective holding in that case.  
Befitting his role as the swing-voting justice on race and equal protection cases 
during this period, Kennedy aligned with the conservative bloc in endorsing the 
established doctrinal framework that embodied the Republican Party ideal of 
generality, and that reflected skepticism of benign racial classifications.203 
Furthermore, in endorsing the Court’s well-established distinction between de jure 
and de facto segregation, Kennedy clearly had no appetite for unsettling the Court’s 
long-running aversion to viewing racial balancing as a compelling or even legitimate 
governmental purpose, absent discrete and formalized past racial discrimination.204 
And yet, befitting a spirit of moderation, Kennedy was also clear in finding a 
limited degree of partiality to be constitutional and appropriate for governmental 
actors and judicial actors to consider. In particular, Kennedy departed from the four 
votes in the conservative bloc by giving explicit recognition to the legitimacy of 
race-conscious governmental action that stopped short of explicit racial classifying: 
 
The plurality opinion is too dismissive of the legitimate interest 
government has in ensuring all people have equal opportunity regardless 
of their race. The plurality’s postulate that “[t]he way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of 
race” is not sufficient to decide these cases. Fifty years of experience since 
Brown v. Board of Education, should teach us that the problem before us 
defies so easy a solution. School districts can seek to reach Brown’s 
objective of equal educational opportunity. The plurality opinion is at least 
open to the interpretation that the Constitution requires school districts to 
ignore the problem of de facto resegregation in schooling. I cannot endorse 
that conclusion. To the extent the plurality opinion suggests the 
Constitution mandates that state and local school authorities must accept 
the status quo of racial isolation in schools, it is, in my view, profoundly 
mistaken.205 
 
This view, when joined with the four votes on the liberal bloc, suggests that partiality 
remained an appropriate element within equal protection jurisprudence and within 
the judicial approach to evaluating race-conscious governmental actions. 
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B.  Judicial Arguments in Support of Partiality 
 
This cautious approach from Kennedy in Parents Involved was likewise present 
in his rulings for the Court in Fisher I and Fisher II. In Fisher I, Kennedy was careful 
to clarify that Grutter’s upholding of race-based higher education admissions was 
not in question.206 The issue in front of the Court was instead a particular question 
surrounding the constitutionality of the race-conscious admission plans at the 
University of Texas207 and concerned whether the narrow tailoring prong of strict 
scrutiny had been satisfied by one of those plans.208 To the latter question, Kennedy 
ultimately offered a fact-specific and narrow “yes.”209 Ginsburg’s dissent in Fisher 
I repeats a similar view, perhaps a little more emphatically, in which she stuck 
closely to precedent in defending race-consciousness in higher education 
admissions.210 
More expansively, in Parents Involved, Justice Breyer set forth a 74-page 
dissent—joined by Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg—that took direct aim at Roberts’s 
opinion for the Court.211 Unsurprisingly, Breyer reached a different conclusion in 
upholding the student assignment plans at issue there. But in keeping with the 
preceding Part, what Breyer offered was something quite a bit less than an 
alternative constitutional vision. Sticking closely to the Democratic Party’s 
orientation to cautious legal pragmatism, what he offered instead was a mix of 
technical doctrinal argument and policy-driven pragmatism. To be sure, one might 
say that these are perhaps characteristics peculiar to Breyer and his jurisprudential 
approach. But one might just as easily say that the elevation of someone like Breyer 
to the Court, with such a jurisprudential approach, says something about 
contemporary party and judicial dynamics as well. 
Central to Breyer’s opinion was a reliance on precedent. In particular, he 
focused on the Court’s rulings on desegregation soon after Brown v. Board of 
Education that were the high chief water-mark of federal judicial intervention on 
school desegregation. Breyer quoted Chief Justice Burger at length in the latter’s 
opinion for the Court in Swann, in support of the use of race-conscious governmental 
actions: 
 
A longstanding and unbroken line of legal authority tells us that the Equal 
Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious 
criteria to achieve positive race-related goals, even when the Constitution 
does not compel it. Because of its importance, I shall repeat what this 
Court said about the matter in Swann. Chief Justice Burger, on behalf of a 
unanimous Court in a case of exceptional importance, wrote: 
                                               
206 Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2421–22 (2013). 
207 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2208–09 (2016). 
208 Fisher I, 133 S.Ct. 2411 (2013). 
209 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2212–14 (2016). 
210 Fisher I, 133 S.Ct. 2411, 2432–34 (2013) (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
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School authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to 
formulate and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for 
example, that in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society 
each school should have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students 
reflecting the proportion for the district as a whole. To do this as an 
educational policy is within the broad discretionary powers of school 
authorities.212  
 
These precedents provided support for Breyer’s earlier comments in his opinion 
rejecting the doctrinal distinction between de jure and de facto segregation that 
Roberts had relied on, in part, to rule against the school districts involved in the 
present case.213 To be sure, Breyer did, at moments, provide a more expansive 
statement on race consciousness that stuck closely to Democratic Party orthodoxy, 
in again invoking Swann: 
 
That Swann’s legal statement should find such broad acceptance is not 
surprising. For Swann is predicated upon a well-established legal view of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. That view understands the basic objective of 
those who wrote the Equal Protection Clause as forbidding practices that 
lead to racial exclusion. The Amendment sought to bring into American 
society as full members those whom the Nation had previously held in 
slavery.214  
 
Yet, also in line with Democratic Party orthodoxy, this statement was based upon 
and emanated from arguments rooted in the Court’s prior doctrine.215 And Breyer’s 
conclusion here ultimately led to the relatively modest conclusion of a more relaxed 
doctrinal test that might generally be applied to benign race-conscious governmental 
actions.216 
Finally, underscoring the modesty of the judicial approach offered by Breyer, 
his acceptance of judicial partiality in his Parents Involved dissent was framed in 
part as both an element of judicial impartiality, and as a requisite part of judicial 
modesty and deference to local governmental authority: 
 
The plurality, or at least those who follow Justice Thomas’ “‘color-blind’” 
approach may feel confident that, to end invidious discrimination, one 
must end all governmental use of race-conscious criteria including those 
with inclusive objectives. By way of contrast, I do not claim to know how 
                                               
212 551 U.S. at 823 (2007) (quoting Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 
U.S. 1, 16 (1971)); see also id. at 823–29, 844–45. 
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2019] MEANING OF JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY 965 
best to stop harmful discrimination; how best to create a society that 
includes all Americans; how best to overcome our serious problems of 
increasing de facto segregation, troubled inner city schooling, and poverty 
correlated with race. But, as a judge, I do know that the Constitution does 
not authorize judges to dictate solutions to these problems. Rather, the 
Constitution creates a democratic political system through which the 
people themselves must together find answers. And it is for them to debate 
how best to educate the Nation’s children and how best to administer 
America’s schools to achieve that aim. The Court should leave them to 
their work. And it is for them to decide, to quote the plurality’s slogan, 
whether the best “way to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop 
discriminating on the basis of race.”217 
 
This was not an emphatic defense of judicial partiality as part of the judicial role 
then. Evident in Breyer’s opinion was judicial acceptance of governmental race-
conscious, though justified by supportive precedents from earlier, more liberal 
Courts, and aligned with a contemporary Democratic orientation to judicial modesty. 
A similar orientation was also present in Breyer’s concurring opinion in 
Schuette, where he found the political-process precedents to be inapplicable in that 
case,218 and ultimately emphasized the importance of deference to democratic 
decision-making bodies in voting to uphold the Michigan state constitutional 
amendment: 
 
Finally, the principle that underlies Hunter and Seattle runs up against a 
competing principle, discussed above. This competing principle favors 
decisionmaking though [sic] the democratic process. Just as this principle 
strongly supports the right of the people, or their elected representatives, 
to adopt race-conscious policies for reasons of inclusion, so must it give 
them the right to vote not to do so.219 
 
One significant exception to this trend of Democratic judicial modesty and 
cautiousness on partiality themes is worthy of extended comment here: Sotomayor’s 
dissent in Schuette.220 There, she offered an expansive dissent from the Court’s 
ruling upholding the Michigan state constitutional amendment. In part, her dissent 
touched on more technical and narrow doctrine-based arguments,221 Michigan-
specific arguments,222 and policy-based arguments on diversity.223 But beyond these 
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points, she also offered extensive references to the history of racial discrimination,224 
arguments in favor of departing from recent conservative precedents,225 and a more 
foundational argument in defense of partiality in the law and in the judicial role.226 
As Sotomayor stated in direct response to Roberts’s assertion in Parents Involved: 
 
In my colleagues’ view, examining the racial impact of legislation only 
perpetuates racial discrimination. This refusal to accept the stark reality 
that race matters is regrettable. The way to stop discrimination on the basis 
of race is to speak openly and candidly on the subject of race, and to apply 
the Constitution with eyes open to the unfortunate effects of centuries of 
racial discrimination. As members of the judiciary tasked with intervening 
to carry out the guarantee of equal protection, we ought not sit back and 
wish away, rather than confront, the racial inequality that exists in our 
society. It is this view that works harm, by perpetuating the facile notion 
that what makes race matter is acknowledging the simple truth that race 
does matter.227 
 
And yet, as much of a departure as Sotomayor’s opinion may have been from other 
recent opinions by left-leaning Supreme Court justices on matters of race and equal 
protection, she spoke only for herself and Justice Ginsburg. The likelihood of a 
Sotomayor approach capturing a majority of votes on the Supreme Court, especially 
with the addition of Justice Kavanaugh, remains quite unlikely for the foreseeable 
future. 
 
V.  JUDICIAL IMPARTIALITY AS ENGAGEMENT 
 
To briefly take stock of the two descriptive claims I have pressed in the 
preceding Parts, I first demonstrated, through an examination of the Roberts and 
Sotomayor confirmations, the greater Republican affinity for generality and the 
greater Democratic affinity for partiality in their respective notions of judicial 
impartiality. Their respective orientations were rooted in each party’s coalitional 
structure and in their ideological histories. Second, I argued that these competing 
conceptions of judicial impartiality translate inexactly to the arena of adjudication. 
In the context of key Roberts Court rulings on race and equal protection, the 
Democratic affinity for partiality emerges as one element within a broader 
inclination among Democratic-appointed justices toward a cautious, progressive 
pragmatism. Likewise, among the Republican-appointed justices, their commitment 
to generality is modified by concessions to doctrinal technicalities and principles, 
carried over from prior Courts, that are supportive of some forms of partiality. 
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Thus, even if Supreme Court confirmation hearings and debates may provide 
relatively simple, clear-cut normative guides on what judicial impartiality demands, 
the picture gets muddled once one examines judicial rulings. And if one takes an 
even broader view that incorporates the centrality of Donald Trump in the modern 
Republican Party, the picture becomes even more muddled: in Trump, we see the 
leader of the Republican Party referencing not a principled belief in generality, but 
a belief in the inevitability of pure, even grotesque, partisanship driving judicial 
behavior.228 True to his comments during his confirmation, it fell to Chief Justice 
Roberts to articulate traditional Republican Party orthodoxy in response to Trump, 
claiming “We do not have Obama judges or Trump judges, Bush judges or Clinton 
judges.”229 
In this Part, I will aim to put forth my third and final claim: that some normative 
guidance in conceptualizing judicial impartiality can be gleaned from these prior 
discussions. That is, notwithstanding enduring partisan differences on the topic, and 
the context of heightened polarization in our political life more broadly, there are 
small areas of commonality that might be uncovered and developed that could reach 
across at least some of the consequential present-day partisan divides. 
Let us start from some of the observations noted earlier in Part II about areas of 
potential convergence between Democratic and Republican senators in the 
confirmation hearings and debates. First, at least as a matter of general perception, 
there seems to be agreement that a degree of partiality in the judicial role seems 
inevitable; it seems inescapable for most that as a structural matter, social facts about 
litigants will have some effect—perhaps greater in some instances and less in 
others—in how those litigants are treated by judicial actors. This may be due to a 
judge’s affinity with or sympathy toward certain social groups driven by common 
background, commonality on some other element of social status, or common 
deeply-held ideologies. Affinity may also be due to the repeated convergence 
between a judge and a particular social group on key legal and policy outcomes. As 
noted in Part II, Democratic senators have been more candid in acknowledging this 
point, though Republican senators have also acknowledged and endorsed the 
possibility of judicial partiality toward those social groups whose interests are (they 
believe) firmly grounded in legitimate constitutional principle. At the same time, 
however, there is certainly something normatively appealing and powerful about the 
aspiration toward generality and universalism, or more precisely, the hope that legal 
outcomes may be rooted in something more compelling than mere judicial whim or 
unprincipled favoritism. 
I refer then to a point raised before in Part II: that at root, what Democratic and 
Republican senators seem to be inching toward in their competing notions of judicial 
impartiality is that a litigant might receive a fair chance, or fair treatment, in front of 
an impartial judge, no matter who that litigant might be. A tentative and normatively-
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attractive conception of judicial impartiality thus emerges: accepting that some 
degree of partiality is inevitable in the judicial role—and that judges cannot be 
wholly blind to certain social facts about litigants appearing before them—I would 
assert that judicial impartiality denotes a consistent, good-faith engagement with the 
claims and interests of those who lie outside the social groups that are aligned with 
a judicial actor. Impartiality demands, in other words, openness on the part of a 
judicial actor to consider experiences, opinions, and values that may lie beyond their 
own inclinations. 
Judicial impartiality-as-engagement remains, admittedly, quite vague and 
abstract and it provides no ready analytical tools for easily determining if judicial 
impartiality was displayed by a given judicial actor in a given case. Consistent, good-
faith engagement is a procedural element, whose presence or absence we might 
ascertain with varying degrees of confidence only after extended observation of a 
judicial actor, and close examination of their treatment of multiple cases. Even after 
this, and even if opinions may converge among observers on some points, opinions 
might still diverge on the ultimate determination of whether the judicial actor was 
impartial or not. 
This is all to suggest that in the contemporary context, a realistic and 
normatively-attractive conception of judicial impartiality may amount to something 
more like an attitude or a spirit rather than a coherent set of discrete principles, or a 
commitment to any set of outcomes. Indeed, the definition I am providing suggests 
that two judges reaching the same legal outcome may not necessarily share the same 
orientation toward judicial impartiality: one judge might conceivably reach an 
outcome by engaging in an impartial manner, as I have defined it, while another 
judge might conceivably reach the same outcome by ruling in a wholly indifferent 
or impulsive or biased manner. 
Yet, as vague as this definition might be at the micro-level, I believe it also 
provides more analytical value from a broader vantage point—especially if applied 
to something as broad as general orientations toward judicial impartiality from 
Democrats and Republicans. Applied to this question, judicial impartiality-as-
engagement does provide some lessons for Democrats and Republicans interested 
in furthering this ideal, and in offering a coherent vision of their party’s judicial and 
legal philosophy.  
For Democrats, their spirit of caution in recent years superficially aligns with 
the notion of judicial impartiality offered here. However, one might argue that this 
caution and tentativeness has nevertheless failed to benefit Democrats in being 
viewed as staunch upholders of judicial impartiality beyond their core constituencies 
because, arguably, their caution has been misplaced: even if Democratic Party 
jurisprudential principles have been applied in a qualified way, the Party and its 
judicial appointees are still too closely identified with their core constituencies and 
key policy commitments to give them much credibility beyond their usual allies. 
However, there might be a different way forward for Democrats to reach across the 
aisle, and bolster their claims to judicial impartiality, by utilizing a different mix of 
principle and caution. 
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If impartiality-as-engagement presses judicial actors to look to interests and 
claims beyond those of their usual allies, the Democratic affinity toward partiality 
should arguably be more, rather than less, expansive and full-throated. That is, 
Democrats and Democratic-appointed judicial actors might consider the possibility 
of embracing partiality themes more empathically—as consistent with their core 
principles and as consistent with how the Party is more broadly viewed. However, 
with a more emphatic endorsement of partiality, Democratic-appointed judicial 
actors might then proceed to apply it to a broader range of social groups—beyond 
the Party’s usual allies—who might plausibly press forth their own claims of 
systemic or structural disadvantage. In this way, the Party and its judicial appointees 
might undertake a broader engagement beyond its usual constituents and 
demonstrate willingness to engage more broadly with the perspectives of others. 
The one example that seems prominent, in this regard, are those disadvantaged 
by economic class. Accordingly, the modern-day Democratic party has retained a 
degree of uncertainty on how much it might incorporate class grievances within its 
party ideology in the preceding few decades.230 And even if more of this rhetoric has 
seeped into the Party since the 2016 presidential election, certainly no coherent 
liberal judicial philosophy focused on economic disadvantage seems guaranteed to 
be central to the Party’s ideology either.231 Again, to further the ideal of judicial 
impartiality as described here, Democratic political actors and judicial appointees 
could bring such ideas back to central prominence. 
For Republicans, their legal emphasis on generality and universalism certainly 
has its moments as appealing rhetoric for some in the Party, as does the Trump-
inspired emphasis on rural, white, conservative grievance for others.232 Perhaps 
ironically, however, what is common to both of these facets of modern-day 
Republican Party ideology is a kind of rigidity and dogmatism that conflicts with 
the notion of judicial impartiality offered here. Thus, in order for Republican judicial 
actors—who have been shaped by such ideals—to move closer to a norm of judicial 
impartiality-as-engagement, the key question would be their willingness to openly 
endorse and affirm a spirit of tentativeness and cautiousness on legal questions. To 
be dogmatic is to foreclose genuine engagement, so for Republican judicial actors 
to move toward the latter, adopting some of the Democratic spirit of cautious 
pragmatism would be ideal. This would entail more than simply toning down some 
of the rigid insistence on, for example, originalism, or the significance of gun rights, 
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or the significance of property rights. More than this, it would entail Republican 
judicial actors affirming a cautious, pragmatic approach as normatively-defensible 
in its own right. If such a hypothetical seems hard to imagine in the present moment, 
we might remember that the values of moderate Republicanism in the early to middle 
decades of the twentieth century would have aligned quite well such an approach. 
As Kabaservice notes of this philosophy:  
 
Because [moderate Republicans] believed in disinterested consideration of 
the issues, they were able to work with Democrats to solve problems, and 
to maintain a level of balance and civility in politics that has long since 
vanished. But because they were not beholden to the Democrats’ coalition 
of special-interest constituencies, they could take a broader and longer-
term viewpoint and uphold values such as civil liberties and meritocracy 
that commanded only weak support from both Democrats and 
conservative Republicans.233  
 
It is a testament to how transformed the Republican Party has become that there is 
no obvious or emphatic standard-bearer for these values among high-profile 
Republicans at present. 
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 
In this paper, I have put forth two descriptive claims: one concerning divergent 
conceptions of judicial impartiality between Democratic and Republican senators in 
the context of Supreme Court confirmation hearings and debates, and one 
concerning competing conceptions of judicial impartiality by Supreme Court 
justices in the context of key race and equal protection rulings by the Roberts Court. 
In the preceding Part, I have also put forth a third claim more normative in nature: 
that judicial impartiality might best be understood, in the present time, as consistent, 
good-faith engagement by judicial actors with the claims and interests of individuals 
or groups who are not obviously aligned with those judicial actors, either by 
ideology or by other significant elements of social status.  
Underlying this normative claim, and its recommendation that contemporary 
judicial actors approach their work and their rulings with such a spirit of open-
mindedness, is my background belief that the forms and processes that constitute 
much of the activity of law matter. That is, there is a significance that attaches to 
how judges do their work, reach their conclusions, and conduct themselves that 
exists independently of the specific outcomes and policy conclusions they will reach.  
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It seems that especially in a time of intense political polarization and disagreement 
over substantive legal and policy issues, the cultivation of basic norms such as 
judicial impartiality-as-engagement by judicial and non-judicial actors will be all the 
more crucial for the health of the American polity. 
